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and
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Comparative Jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Court of Human
Rights
Jo M. Pasqualucci*
ABSTRACT

Restrictions on freedom of expression may take direct and
indirect forms.
A state may censor speech, criminalize
defamation, harass the media or individualjournalists, fail to
investigate crimes against the media , require the compulsory
licensing of journalists, or fail to enact freedom of information
laws or laws that prohibit monopoly ownership of the media. A
victim of a restriction on freedom of expression that violates
international law may have no recourse in domestic courts,
either because state law offers no remedy or because judges are
too intimidated to enforce the laws as written. In such
instances, victims need recourse to an international forum to
protect and enforce their rights. In the Western hemisphere
individual allegationsof violations of freedom of expression may
be brought before the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and, dependent on jurisdiction, tried by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.
These organs have
developed a progressive case law on the right of freedom of
expression. The Author critiques the contributions made by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the growing
internationaljurisprudence on freedom of expression. Whenever
possible, the Author analyzes the Inter-American Court's case
holdings in light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Human Rights and the U.N. Human Rights Committee. The
Article also addresses issues that have not yet been presented to
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the Inter-American Court and analyzes potential issues in light
of the American Convention.
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"Real democracy exists only when individuals are free to say what
they think, and to receive and impart information."'

I. INTRODUCTION

In a landmark international case on freedom of expression, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that the Costa Rican
government had violated the right to freedom of expression of a Costa
Rican journalist as a result of his criminal conviction in national
courts for defamation. 2 The journalist had written a series of articles
for the well-known Costa Rican newspaper, La Naci6n, concerning
Costa Rica's honorary representative to the International Atomic
Energy Commission in Europe. The articles quoted or reproduced
parts of several articles from Belgian newspapers which alleged that
the Costa Rican representative had engaged in illegal activities such
as drug trafficking and tax fraud.3 The journalist presented both
sides of the story and even printed a letter from the diplomat
disputing the allegations. 4 Nevertheless, the diplomat brought both
criminal and civil suits for defamation in Costa Rican courts. 5 Under
Costa Rican law the defendant journalist bore the burden of proving
the truth of the statements that he had quoted from and attributed to
the foreign press. The burden was not, as would be expected, on the
plaintiff to prove the falsehood of the statements. The journalist
could not meet this burden and, therefore, was convicted of a crime.
Both the journalist and the newspaper, who were jointly and
severally liable, were ordered to pay large fines, and the name of the
journalist was inscribed in the criminal register. 6 The journalist
subsequently filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (Inter-American Commission or Commission)
alleging that his freedom of speech was violated by the criminal
conviction. 7 The Commission found in his favor.8 When Costa Rica did
not comply with the Commission's recommendations, the Commission

1.
KAYHAN KARACA, GUARDING THE WATCHDOG: THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND
THE MEDIA 11 (2003).
2.
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107,
135

(Jul. 2, 2004).
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.

95(d)-(i).
95(g).
95(p).
95(t).
6.
11.
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filed an application with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(Inter-American Court or Court). 9
Laws criminalizing defamation are not uncommon throughout
the world. Even some U.S. states still have criminal defamation
laws.' 0 Public officials and other powerful individuals can use these
laws as a weapon to intimidate the media from revealing corrupt
practices or publicizing incriminating information. Journalists and
the media may be pressured not to write or broadcast news because
its publication could result in a criminal law suit. This self-censorship
of the media negatively affects the public's right to information.
Criminal defamation laws are one manner of repressing freedom
of expression. Other forms of repression may be direct, as in the form
of censorship, or may be indirect, by a means intended to exert
control over the media or to have a chilling effect on one journalist or
the profession as a whole. Repression may take the forms of physical
harassment, imprisonment, or murder of journalists; failure to
diligently investigate or prosecute crimes against the media;
compulsory government licensing of journalists; or the requirement
that a journalist reveal anonymous sources. Alternately, a State may
fail to promulgate or enforce laws that will protect freedom of
expression, such as access to information laws or laws prohibiting a
monopoly of the media.
Often the person whose freedom of expression is threatened has
no recourse in domestic courts, either because the law favors the
powerful or because judges are too intimidated to enforce the laws as
written. In such instances victims need recourse to an international
forum to protect and secure their human rights. In the Western
Hemisphere individual allegations of violations of freedom of
expression may be brought before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and, dependent on jurisdiction, before the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. In European States, alleged
victims can bring a case before the European Court of Human Rights.
For victims throughout the world, the U.N. Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) may be authorized to consider individual complaints. This
Article will critique the contributions made by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights to the growing international jurisprudence on
freedom of expression. Whenever possible, the Inter-American Court's
response will be analyzed in light of the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights and the decisions of the UNHRC.
The Article also addresses issues that have not yet been presented to

9.

Id.

27.

10.
Although they are seldom used, criminal defamation statutes remain on the
books in about half of U.S. states. JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAw:
LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND THE MODERN MEDIA 116 (4th ed. 2004). Occasionally they

are used to prosecute malicious internet postings. Id.
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the Inter-American Court and analyzes potential issues in light of the
American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention).
The Inter-American Court's jurisprudence on freedom of
expression and freedom of the press has been influential in the
developing democracies of the Americas. Its decisions and reasoning
may also influence other international fora. While the Inter-American
Court has addressed many of the pressing issues confronting
journalists and the mass media internationally, the Court has not
fully utilized every opportunity to influence the development of an
on freedom of expression. An
international jurisprudence
international human rights tribunal such as the Inter-American
Court should not limit itself to the most restrictive view of the issues
presented in a case. Human rights issues must be decided on the
international level so that subsequent victims may receive justice in
national courts. The Inter-American Court sits only part-time." Even
the European Court, which is a full-time court, has a serious backlog
of cases. 12 These courts do not have the resources to repeatedly decide
cases involving the same rights. For this reason, the Court must seize
each opportunity to develop an international jurisprudence in areas of
controversy.
Part II of this Article briefly describes the Inter-American
human rights system so as to lay a foundation for its decisions and
opinions. Part III sets forth freedom of expression under the
American Convention. Part IV analyzes the American Convention's
limits on censorship. Part V interprets permissible restrictions on
freedom of expression, including restrictions to protect reputations
and national security, as well as the Convention's treatment of
propaganda for war and hate speech. This Part also contains an
extensive analysis of the Inter-American Court's recent decisions on
criminal defamation. Part VI evaluates the juridical contributions of
the Inter-American Court to freedom of the press, focusing on the
effective use of interim measures to curtail harassment of journalists
and jurisprudence prohibiting the mandatory State licensing of
journalists. It also discusses future issues that the Court may have to
confront, such as contempt laws for a journalist's refusal to reveal
sources, and suggests an analysis of these issues. Part VII discusses
areas in which States may inhibit freedom of expression by failing to

11.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights approved
on Nov. 25, 2003, during Sessions 9 and 10 of the Court's LXI Ordinary Period of
Sessions, held from November 20 to December 4, 2003, art. 10-11 [hereinafter Rules of
Procedure Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.].
12.
See e.g., Luzius Wildhaber, President of the European Court of Human
Rights, Address at the High Level Seminar on the Reform of the European Human
Rights System 2 (Oct. 18, 2004), transcript available at http:/! www.echr.coe.int/
[hereinafter Wildhaber, Oslo Speech] (follow "Press" hyperlink; then follow "Speeches
of the President of the Court" hyperlink; then follow "Oslo, 18 October 2004" hyperlink)
("Since 1998 the backlog is growing inexorably.").
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promulgate or enforce access to information
monopolization of ownership of the media.

laws

and

the

II. THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM
A brief description of the Inter-American human rights system is
necessary for an understanding of the impact of the jurisprudence of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the decisions of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The Inter-American
system was created by the Organization of American States (OAS) to
provide for human rights protection in the Americas. 13 The principle
human rights treaty, the American Convention, 14 has been ratified by
twenty-four of the thirty-five member States of the OAS.' 5 State
parties to the American Convention contract to observe twenty-six
rights and freedoms including freedom of thought and expression,
freedom from slavery, freedom of movement and residence, and the
rights to life, humane treatment, privacy, property, personal liberty, a
fair trial, judicial protection, equal protection, and participation in
government. 16 The American Convention provides for two organs to
ensure State compliance with the rights set forth in the treaty: the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 17 and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. i8 Those States that have not
ratified the American Convention are still subject to the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which provides in part
that "[e]very person has the right to freedom of investigation, or
opinion, and of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by any
medium whatsoever."' 9

13.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, pmbl., 9 I.L.M. 163
[hereinafter American Convention].
14.
Id. The American Convention and other Inter-American human rights
documents can be viewed on the OAS website, http://www.oas.org, or on the website of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, http://www.corteidh.or.cr. The annual
reports and cases of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights can be found at
its website, http://www.cidh.oas.org.
15.
OAS ratifying parties are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago, which had ratified the American Convention
denounced it in 1998. Cuba was excluded from participating in the OAS in 1962 for
adopting a Marxist-Leninist form of government. The United States has not ratified
the American Convention.
16.
American Convention, supra note 13, arts. 4-25.
17.
Id. art. 33(a).
18.
Id. art. 33(b).
19.
Ninth Int'l Conference of American States, American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, art. IV, O.A.S. Res. XXX, (Bogota, Colombia, 1948),
availableat http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm.
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An individual who claims that a State party to the American
Convention has violated his or her rights must first exhaust all
domestic remedies in the State where the violation allegedly
occurred. 20 Only after failing to receive satisfaction in domestic courts
may the alleged victim approach the Inter-American human rights
system. 21 The petitioner initially files a complaint with the InterAmerican Commission. 22 When the issue in the case involves freedom
of expression, the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
will analyze the complaint and advise the Commission.2 3 If the
Commission determines that the complaint is admissible, the Special
Rapporteur will participate with the Commission in any hearings and
24
will work with the parties to achieve a friendly settlement. The
Commission sits only part-time and has a backlog of cases, so the
knowledge is of
Special Rapporteur's expertise and specialized
25
particular assistance to the Commission.
When the Commission's procedures have been completed in a
contentious case, the Commission or the State may file an application
with the Inter-American Court. 26 The individual does not have
standing to bring a contentious case before the Court, although once
an application has been filed, the alleged victim may proceed
independently of the Commission. 27 The Court can only exercise its
contentious jurisdiction over those States that have accepted the
28
Court's jurisdiction, either ipso facto or for a particular case.
Twenty-one of the twenty-four State parties to the American
Convention have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court. 29 In its consideration of a case, the Inter-American
Court considers written submissions, including amicus briefs, and it
may hold hearings. After deliberations, it determines whether the
State has violated a right protected by the American Convention and,

20.
21.
22.

American Convention, supra note 13, art. 46(1)(a).
Id.
Id. art. 61(2).

23.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR FREEDOM
=

OF EXPRESSION 2004, at 5-7, http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD
459&lID=l, follow "See Complete Report in PDF' [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT OF
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR].
24.
Id. The goal of the Special Rapporteur is to "stimulate awareness of the
importance of the full observance of freedom of expression and information in the
Hemisphere, given the fundamental role it plays in the consolidation and advancement
of the democratic system .... Id. at 6.
See id. at 5-7.
25.
26.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 61.
27.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court, supra note 11, art. 23(1).
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 62(1).
28.
29.
States accepting the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court
are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.

386

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

[VOL. 39379

if so, the Court determines the reparations that must be made by the
State. The Inter-American Court's decisions are binding on the
30
parties to a contentious case.
The Court also can contribute to the conceptual evolution of
freedom of expression and other rights by responding to requests for
advisory opinions. 31 Under its advisory jurisdiction, the Court can
interpret the American Convention and other human rights treaties
to which American States are parties. 32 The Court is also authorized
to give States opinions as to whether their domestic laws are
compatible with the Convention or other treaties. 33 In addition, the
Inter-American Court can order States to take provisional measures
to protect persons, including journalists, who are in grave and urgent
34
danger of irreparable injury.
Various resolutions and principles have been adopted in the
Inter-American system to assist the Commission and the Court in
evaluating situations in which freedom of expression is in question.
Most fundamental is the Inter-American Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression, which was approved by the Inter-American
Commission.3 5 Additionally, the OAS General Assembly has adopted
resolutions on the "Right to Freedom of Thought and Expression and
the Importance of the Media" and "Access to Public Information:
'36
Strengthening Democracy.

III.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE AMERICAN CONVENTION

Article 13 of the American Convention provides in relevant part
that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought and expression.
This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing,
in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of one's
choice. '37 The Inter-American Court interprets the right of freedom of

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

American Convention, supra note 13, art. 68(1).
Id. art. 64.
Id. art. 64(1).
Id. art. 64(2).
Id. art. 63(2).
Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, approved

by the Inter-American Commission, in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS

IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 211; see Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression, http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatorial
showarticle.asp?artID=26&lID=l [hereinafter Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression].
36.
See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THIRTYFIFTH REGULAR SESSION, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/gaO5/gaO5.doc.

37.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13. Freedom of expression is
protected by all the major human rights treaties. Article 10(1) of the European
Convention similarly provides that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression.
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expression to have two interdependent dimensions: an individual
dimension and a social dimension.3 8 The Court clarified that the
individual dimension of freedom of expression is broader than the
theoretical right to write and speak. 39 The individual dimension
"includes and cannot be separated from the right to use whatever
medium is deemed appropriate to impart ideas and to have them
reach as wide an audience as possible. '40 According to the Court, the
social dimension of freedom of expression "is a means for the
interchange of ideas and information" and includes both the
individual's right to communicate views to others as well as the right
to receive news and opinions from others.4 1 In this respect, the Court
reasoned that it is equally important for ordinary citizens to have
42
access to others' opinions as to share their own.
The individual and social dimensions of freedom of speech must
be guaranteed
simultaneously. 43 The Inter-American
Court
emphasized that freedom of expression is

This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers."
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as
amended by Protocol No. 11, Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 106. Article 19(2) of the U.N.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which entered into force
on March 23, 1976, provides, "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice." Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and
People's Rights, which entered into force on October 21, 1986, reads in relevant part,
"1) Every individual shall have the right to receive information. 2) Every individual
shall have the right to express and disseminate his opinion within the law."
38.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5,
31-32
(Nov. 13, 1985). The Court specifically stated that freedom of thought and expression
"requires, on the one hand, that no one be arbitrarily limited or impeded in expressing
his own thoughts. In that sense, it is a right that belongs to each individual. Its second
aspect, on the other hand, implies a collective right to receive any information
whatsoever and to have access to the thoughts expressed by others." Canese v.
Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, 77 (Aug. 31, 2004).
39.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5,
3132; Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107,
109 (Jul. 2,
2004); Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, 77.
40.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85,
31; 'The Last Temptation of Christ," 2001
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 73, 65 (Feb. 5, 2001) (also known as Last Temptation
of Christ case); Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
109.
41.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 32; HerreraUlloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
110; Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 79.
42.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 32; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74,
178 (Feb. 6, 2001); "The Last Temptation of Christ," 2001
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
66; HerreraUlloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
107; Canese, 2004
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 79.
43.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 33; Ivcher Bronstein, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
149; "The Last Temptation of Christ," 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
67; Herrera Ulloa,
2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 111; Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 80.
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indispensable for the formation of public opinion. It is also a condition
sine qua non for the development of political parties, trade unions,
scientific and cultural societies and, in general, those who wish to
influence the public. It represents, in short, the means that enable the
community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed.
Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not well informed is
44
not a society that is truly free.

The Court also adopted the standard set by the European Court of
Human Rights that freedom of expression must be guaranteed not
only for the dissemination of the information and ideas that are
favorably received or considered inoffensive or indifferent, but also for
those that shock, concern or offend the State or any sector of the
population. 45 In essence, freedom of expression is nonexistent if only
statements that are acceptable to the government or the majority of
citizens are allowed to be expressed. All facts and opinions must be
permitted, provided that they are not specifically restricted by the
governing treaty.
The Court has not held that an individual's freedom of
expression is violated when that person is forced to express an
untruth. In the Maritza Urrutia case, a woman was abducted by
Guatemalan State agents and forced to film a video from a prepared
script in which she renounced the opposition force of which she had
been a member. 46 The video was then aired on Guatemalan
television. The applicant argued that the victim's right to freedom of
expression had been violated. The Court, however, found that the
facts supported only a violation of the victim's right to humane
47
treatment and not a violation of her right to freedom of expression.
Despite the Court's determination, the right to freedom of
expression should include freedom from forced speech. 48 In this vein,
the Commission, arguing for the victim, contended that "[t]he
individual dimension of the right to freedom of expression may be

70; Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85,
44.
82. The Inter-American Court has also
112; Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
stated that
the same concept of public order in a democratic society requires the guarantee
of the widest possible circulation of news, ideas and opinions, as well as the
widest access to information by society as a whole. Freedom of expression
constitutes the primary and basic element of the public order of a democratic
society, which is not conceivable without free debate and the possibility that
dissenting voices be fully heard.
Advisory Opinion OC-5185, 70; Ivcher Bronstein, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 151.
113; Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct.
45.
Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
H.R., 83 quoting Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v. Austria, 2003 Eur. Ct.
H.R.596, 29; Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245, 65 (1979).
99(b)
Urrutia v. Guatemala, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 103,
46.
(Nov. 27, 2003).
47.
Id.
103.
48.
Id.
99(b).
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violated both when a person's right to express himself freely is
restricted and when he is obliged, through unlawful acts, to express
himself publicly against his will."'49 In this instance, the Court has
been unduly limited in its approach to freedom of expression. When
individuals, organizations, and the media are illegally forced to make
or publish statements, the Court should rule that there has been a
violation of the victim's freedom of expression. In an earlier advisory
opinion, the Inter-American Court explained that "an extreme
violation of the right to freedom of expression occurs when
governmental power is used for the express purpose of impeding the
free circulation of information, ideas, opinions or news. '50 The
government is equally impeding the circulation of information and
ideas when it subverts the information released to the public. A
person's individual dimension of freedom of expression is violated
when the person is forced to make a statement against her will,
whether that statement be true or false; the social dimension of
freedom of expression is similarly violated when an untrue statement
is presented by force to society as the truth. Consequently, when a
person or the media is illegally obligated to speak or publish a
statement, the Court should hold that the Convention's provision on
freedom of expression has been violated.

IV. PRIOR CENSORSHIP BARRED

The American Convention provides that the exercise of freedom
51
of thought and expression "shall not be subject to prior censorship"
except in specifically limited circumstances. In this regard, the InterAmerican Court has stated that "[a]buse of freedom of information
thus cannot be controlled by preventive measures but only through
the subsequent imposition of sanctions on those who are guilty of the
abuses."5 2 Thus, most injuries resulting from the misuse of freedom of
expression or the media must be compensated through subsequent
lawsuits. The only exceptions to prior censorship authorized by the
American Convention are State regulation of access to public
entertainment "for the moral protection of childhood and
adolescence" 53 and State derogation from its obligations during a
state of emergency. 54 Examples of censorship that go beyond these

49.
Id. 99(c).
54
50.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 5,
(Nov. 13, 1985).
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13(2).
51.
52.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 39.
53.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13(4).
54.
Id. art. 27. Freedom of expression is a right that may be suspended or
derogated from "in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the
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limited exceptions include barring and confiscating publications,
prohibiting the release of movies and television programs for reasons
other than the protection of youth, blocking the content of websites,
or the broadcasting
and halting the publication of certain newspapers
55
of particular radio or television stations.
In its first decision dealing with media censorship, the InterAmerican Court found that Chile had failed to meet its obligations
under the American Convention when it refused to permit the movie
The Last Temptation of Christ to be shown in Chile. 56 The Chilean
National Cinematographic Classification Council had initially
prohibited the exhibition of the film. 57 When the Council eventually
approved its showing, the Chilean courts annulled that approval,
thereby maintaining the censorship of the film. 58 The Chilean
Association of Attorneys for Public Freedom [Asociaci6n de Abogados
por las Libertades Pziblicas] then filed a petition in the InterAmerican human rights system. 59 Both the Commission and then the
Inter-American Court held that Chile had violated the American
The Court
Convention's protection of freedom of expression. 60
ordered Chile to allow the exhibition and publicity for The Last
Temptation of Christ,6 1 and to take the appropriate measures to
amend its domestic laws to eliminate prior censorship of movies so as
to protect freedom of expression in accordance with the American
62
Convention.

independence or security of a State Party." Id. art. 27(1). The State may derogate from
freedom of speech and other rights "to the extent and for the period of time strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law." Id. The suspension of
rights must be non discriminatory, and the State must inform the OAS of the
suspension. Id.
Committee to Protect Journalists, 'Attacks on the Press in 2004" report:
55.
Iran, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.payvand.com/news/05/mar/1127.html.
"The Last Temptation of Christ," 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 73,
56.
88 (Feb. 5, 2001); see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILE: PROGRESS STALLED: SETBACKS IN

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION REFORM (2001), pt. VI. Film Censorship Reform,
http://www.hrw.org/ reports/2001/chile/Foeo5fin-05.htm#P539_145947 [hereinafter Film
Censorship Reform].
"The Last Temptation of Christ," 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 60(c); see Film
57.
Censorship Reform, supra note 56.
"The Last Temptation of Christ," 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 60(e), (f).
58.
59.
Id. 5.
Id.
96-97.
60.
Id.
61.
Id. 4. The Court reasoned that,
62.
[i]n international law, customary law stablishes that a State which has ratified
a human rights treaty must introduce the necessary modifications to its
domestic law to ensure the proper compliance with the obligations it has
assumed. This law is universally accepted, and is supported by jurisprudence.
The American Convention establishes the general obligation of each State
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Following the Court's ruling, the Chilean Congress commenced a
reformation of the law so as to eliminate censorship and to remove
military influence from the National Cinematographic Classification
Council. 63 The reformed council
consists
of film critics,
representatives of the film industry, education specialists, and
professors. 64 In 2002, the Chilean Senate put an end to film
65
censorship by enacting legislation to comply with the Court's orders.
The new law establishes a ratings system based on age that is similar
66
to the ratings categories employed in Europe and the United States.
Thus, the Court's use of reparations to order the State to amend its
laws to conform to the American Convention resulted in greater
freedom of expression.
In a subsequent case also involving Chile, the Inter-American
Court held that Chile's censorship of the book Ethics and the
Intelligence Services [Etica y Servicios de Inteligencia] violated the
author's right to freedom of expression.6 7 The Chilean government
prohibited the distribution of the book 68 because the author,
Palamara Iribarne, a retired Chilean naval officer, did not request
the prior authorization for publication required by the military. 69 The
government seized all copies of the book, deleted it from the computer
of the author, and convicted the author of disobedience and
endangering public security and defense.7 0 The government
unsuccessfully argued before the Inter-American Court that because
it seized the books after they were published and a small number
already had been distributed, it had not exercised prior censorship of
the book. 71 The Court explained that freedom to express thought and
the dissemination of that expression are "indivisible. '72 In other
words, a State does not effectively protect freedom of expression if it
unduly restricts its dissemination. 73 Despite the government's

Party to adapt its domestic law to the provisions of this Convention, in order to
guarantee the rights that it embodies.
Id.

96.
63.
Film Censorship Reform, supra note 56.
64.
See Index for Free Expression, Chile: End to Film Censorship,
http://www.indexonline.org/er/indexindex/articles/2002/1/end-to-film-censorship.shtml
(last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, 78
(Nov. 22, 2005).
68.
Id.
69.
Id. 63(6). The book dealt with the need for military intelligence activities
to conform to certain ethics. Id.
70.
Id. 7 63(19)-(23), 74.
71.
Id. 66(a).
72.
Id. 72.
73.
Id.
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arguments that its actions did not violate the American Convention,
the State informed the Court that a bill then before the Chilean
Congress would restrict judges' authority to order the censure and
74
seizure of publications.
The State also argued that it actions were justified because
Palarama Iribarne had violated a confidentiality agreement under
which he had sworn not to reveal any secret or confidential
information concerning the armed forces which he had acquired
during his service in the military. 7 5 Two experts designated by the
military contradicted the State by opining that the book did not
jeopardize the security of the Chilean armed forces. 76 The experts
explained that the information in the book could be obtained from
public sources.7 7 They acknowledged, however, that it was implicit
that Palamara Iribarne had gained the education and training
necessary to write the book through his experience as a military
intelligence specialist.7 8 The Inter-American Court did not address
the State's argument, stating only that the failure to honor a
confidentiality agreement can result in administrative, civil or
disciplinary responsibilities but not, in a case such as that of
Palamara Iribarne, when the information divulged is already in the
79
public sphere.

V. RESTRICTIONS ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Freedom of expression is not absolute. It must be balanced
against the rights of others and the welfare of society. The American
Convention broadly provides that "[t]he rights of each person are
limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just
demands of the general welfare in a democratic society. 80° The
American Convention also sets forth permissible restrictions on the
right to freedom of expression. The Court has warned that laws
restricting freedom of expression to protect the rights of others should

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

63(h).
66(d), (e).
63(23).
75.

79.

Id.

77.

80.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 32(2). In general, restrictions on
the enjoyment or exercise of any of the rights and freedoms provided for in the InterAmerican Convention, including freedom of expression, must be applied "in accordance
with laws enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with the purpose
for which such restrictions have been enacted." Id. art. 30.
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in no way serve as a means of prior censorship. 81 Generally, the
Inter-American Court is asked to determine whether particular
governmental acts were undue restrictions on freedom of information.
In these cases the Inter-American Court examines the alleged
violation, given all the facts in the case and the context and
82
circumstances in which the acts occurred.
A permissible restriction on freedom of expression must be
prescribed by law, satisfy a legitimate purpose specified in the
American Convention, and be necessary in a democratic society.8 3 A
restriction has been prescribed by law when there is a domestic
statute in effect that limits freedom of expression. The State must
identify the domestic law that authorizes the restriction and show
that the law has a legitimate purpose. The legitimate purposes
permitted by the American Convention include ensuring "respect for
the rights or reputations of others or the protection of national
8' 4
security, public order, or public health or morals.
Even though a domestic law has a legitimate purpose, it may not
limit freedom of expression more than is strictly necessary in a
democratic society.8 5 The State must choose the least restrictive
option available to limit a protected right.8 6 The Inter-American
Court stated in this regard that the necessity and thus the legality of
restrictions "depend[s] upon showing that'87the restrictions are
required by a compelling public interest.
To demonstrate a
compelling public interest the State has the burden to specifically
show that there is a pressing social need for the restriction.8 8 The
Court clarified that it is not sufficient for the State to demonstrate

81.

Canese v. Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111,

31, 2004); Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 5,

95 (Aug.

32 (Nov.

13, 1985).

82.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 42.
83.
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, 120
(July 2, 2004). Likewise, the European Court and the UNHRC require that restrictions
on the exercise of freedom of expression must be prescribed by law, have a legitimate
purpose, and be necessary and justified. See Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 245, 59 (1979).
84.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13(2).
85.
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 95.
86.
Id.
96; Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 1 121; Advisory Opinion
OC-5/85, 7 46, 59; see also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245,
59 (1979).
87.
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 96.
88.
The Inter-American Court espoused the European Court of Human Rights'
interpretation of "necessary" to require the existence of a "pressing social need."
Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
122 (citing Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 245,
59 (1979); Advisory Opinion OC-5/85,
46; Canese,
2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 96.)
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that a law performs a useful or desirable purpose; to be compatible with
the Convention, the restrictions must be justified by reference to
collective purposes, which, owing to their importance, clearly outweigh
the social need for the full enjoyment of the right Article 13 guarantees
and do not limit the right established in this Article more than is
89
strictly necessary.

The Inter-American Court employs a proportionality test in
determining whether a restriction is necessary. The Court explained
that "the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that
justifies it and closely tailored to accomplishing this legitimate
objective, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of
90
the right to freedom of expression."
A. Restriction to Protect Reputation: Defamatory Statements
The American Convention stipulates that freedom of expression
is subject to "respect for the rights or reputations of others." 91
Although freedom of expression is protected by the American
Convention, it may legitimately be restricted if the content of the
speech is defamatory. A defamatory statement impugns the honor or
reputation of another person. 92 Persons who have been defamed may
93
have a cause of action against the person who made the statement.
Some States allow a defamation suit to be filed in either civil or
94
criminal court or in both.
Criminal defamation suits can result in an abuse of freedom of
expression. 9 5 Particularly egregious are desacato laws, also referred
to as "insult laws" or "contempt laws," which criminalize any

96; Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct.
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
89.
H.R.,
121; Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 46; see also Sunday Times, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R.
59. Note that English translations of the above quote are not uniform in all cases,
although the wording in Spanish is identical.
96; Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct.
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
90.
H.R.,
123.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13(2)(a). In the sense that the
91.
right to privacy includes the right of each individual to have his or her "honor respected
and dignity recognized" it could be said that the right to freedom of expression must be
balanced against that right. See id. art. 11.
92.
See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). "The statement is likely to
lower that person in the estimation of reasonable people and in particular to cause that
person to be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear, or dislike." Id.
"Libel is written or visual defamation; slander is oral or aural defamation." Id.
Id.
93.
See Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107,
94.
95
(p).
95.
Press Release, Human Rights Watch: Human Rights News, Chile: Former
Political Prisoner Convicted of Defamation (Apr. 28, 2004) (stating that "defamation
laws must be carefully circumscribed so as not to violate freedom of expression"),
Former
Chile:
[hereinafter
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/28/chile8509.htm
Political Prisoner Convicted of Defamation].
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"expression which offends, insults, or threatens a public functionary
in the performance of his or her official duties. '9 6 Governments and
other officials may employ such criminal defamation laws to
"suppress criticism of official wrongdoing, maladministration and
corruption, and to avoid public scrutiny. '97 Even the threat of a
criminal defamation suit may result in self-censorship by journalists
or the media and have a chilling effect on freedom of speech. A
conviction can result in incarceration and a large fine for the person
who made the statement as well as a fine for any media outlet that
reports it. 98 Although the action may be ultimately unsuccessful, the
plaintiff who brought the action has exacted revenge against the
party who made the statement. Such suits can cause permanent
harm to the professional reputation of a reporter even if the charge is
unsubstantiated, in that criminal prosecution may lead the public to
believe that reliable evidence existed to support the prosecution.
International bodies and press associations have condemned
criminal defamation laws, and some State courts have held that they
are unconstitutional.9 9 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights
endorsed a statement by its Special Rapporteurs that "[d]etention, as
a negative sanction for the peaceful expression of opinion, is one of
the most reprehensible practices employed to silence people and
accordingly constitutes a serious violation of human rights."10 0 The
Inter-American Declaration on Principles of Freedom of Expression
states "[l]aws that penalize offensive expressions directed at public
officials, generally known as 'desacato laws,' restrict freedom of

96.
Press Release, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Satisfaction with
the Repeal of 'Descato" In Costa Rica, No. 19/02 (Apr. 25, 2002), http://www.cidh.org/
Comunicados/EnglishI2002/Pressl9.02.htm [hereinafter Satisfaction with the Repeal of
'Descato" In Costa Rica]; see Jairo E. Lanao, Legal Challenges to Freedom of the Press in the
Americas, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 347, 365 (2002).
97.
ARTICLE XIX, RIGHTS VS. REPUTATIONS: CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ABUSE OF
DEFAMATION AND INSULT LAWS 1 (2003), http://www.article19.org/pdfs/tools/
defamation-campaigns-pack.pdf [hereinafter RIGHTS VS. REPUTATIONS].
98.
Id.
99.
The International Press Institute passed the following resolution in
reference to criminal defamation laws:
The world's leading journalists represented in the International Press Institute
accordingly call on parliaments to abolish such laws, on governments to refrain
from using them where they exist and to call for their revocation, and on courts
to refuse to invoke them and to rule that they violate the fundamental human
rights of free speech and press freedom.
Press Release, International Press Institute [IPI], Resolutions Passed by the 53rd IPI
General Assembly, Resolution on Criminal Defamation and "Insult Laws" (May 18,
2004), http://www.freemedia.at/resolutions2004.htm.
100.
Id.

396

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39:379

expression and the right to information."'10 1 In 2005, the Honduran
and Guatemalan Constitutional Courts declared desacato laws to be
unconstitutional, 0 2 and the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly
03
removed desacato laws from the Costa Rican criminal code.1
1. The Inter-American Court's Jurisprudence on Defamation
The Inter-American Court positively influenced international
jurisprudence in the area of criminal defamation in 2005. The InterAmerican Court decided three criminal defamation cases in which the
applicant had been convicted in domestic courts of defaming a public
10 4
official or person who was involved in activities of public interest.
The Court ruled in each case that criminal defamation was not the
least restrictive means of limiting freedom of expression so as to
protect other rights and, therefore, the State had violated the rights
of the person convicted domestically of criminal defamation. In
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, also known as La Naci6n Newspaper
Case, discussed in the introduction, the Court held that requiring a
journalist to prove the truth of statements made by third parties was
an excessive restriction on the journalist's right to freedom of
expression,10 5 and that there is a higher standard of protection for
statements made about persons whose activities are within the
10 6
domain of public interest.
In Canese v. Paraguay, the Inter-American Court stated that
'penal laws are the most restrictive and severest means of
establishing liability for an unlawful conduct.' 10 7 When combined
with the Court's statements that the least restrictive means of
interference with freedom of expression must be used, 0 8 and that a

101.

Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle

11.

102.
Press Release, OAS, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression of the IACHR, The Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression of the IACHR Expresses its Satisfaction with Decisions in Guatemala and
Honduras Declaring Descato Laws Unconstitional, No. 126/05 (July 1, 2005),
http://www.cidh.oas.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artID=638&lID=l; Honduran High
Court Strikes Down Descato Provision, CPJ 2005 NEWS ALERT, May 26, 2005,
http://www.cpj.org/news/2005/Honduras26may05na.html.
103.
Satisfaction with the Repeal of "Descato" In Costa Rica, supra note 96.
104.
Canese v. Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, (Aug. 31,
2004); Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, (Jul. 2,
2004); Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, (Nov. 22,

2005).
105.
Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
132-35.
106.
Id.
127-29.
107.
Canese v. Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111,
31, 2004).
108.
Id.
96.

104 (Aug.
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criminal proceeding combined with other factors constitutes "an
unnecessary and excessive punishment" for statements made in the
context of a campaign for election,10 9 one can infer that criminal
sanctions for defamation are not a proportionate restriction on
freedom of expression in political campaigns. Civil defamation suits
must suffice to repair damage to reputations in that context. In
Canese, a former Paraguayan presidential candidate, Richard
Canese, had been convicted of criminal defamation by Paraguayan
courts for statements he made about another candidate during the
campaign for the presidency of the country. 110 During the campaign,
Canese accused the rival candidate of having enriched himself with
the assistance of the former dictator of Paraguay.11 ' In one
newspaper interview he stated that the opposing candidate,
Wasmosy, had "passed from bankruptcy to the most spectacular
wealth, thanks to the support from the dictator's family. ' 1 12 Wasmosy
won the election, becoming the President of Paraguay," 3 and Canese
was subsequently convicted in Paraguayan courts of criminal
defamation, sentenced to two months in prison, fined, and
permanently prohibited from leaving the country.11 4 After Canese
had lost several domestic appeals, petitioners filed a complaint in his
favor with the Commission." 5 The Commission found that the
Paraguayan criminal conviction violated the American Convention
and recommended to the State that it lift the sanctions against
Canese." 6 When the State failed to do so, the Commission referred

109.
Id.
106. The Canese case was decided after the Herrera Ulloa case. The
Court did not address the issue of the criminalization of crimes against honor in
Herrera Ulloa. See Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
110.
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
69(7). Canese, an industrial engineer
who had researched and written books and articles about the Itaipu hydroelectric
power plant, had in earlier years been exiled to Holland for his opposition to the former
Paraguayan dictator Alfredo Stroessner. Id.
69(1)(2). Canese had also filed reports
alleging corruption and tax evasion against the company contracted to build the power
plant, a company that also had been investigated for corrupt practices by the National
Congress of Paraguay. Id. 69(3).
111.
Id.
69(7). Canese was a candidate in the 1993 Paraguayan presidential
election opposing Juan Carlos Wasmosy, the chairman of the board of the Paraguayan
company that had constructed the Itaipu project. Id. 69(2).
112.
Id.
69(7).
Canese alleged that the Stroessner family had allowed
Wasmosy to assume the chairmanship of CONEMPA, the consortium that enjoyed a
Paraguayan monopoly of the principal civil works of Itaipu. Id. In another interview
Canese alleged that "in practice, Mr. Wasmosy was the Stroessner family's front man
in CONEMPA, and the company transferred substantial dividends to the dictator." Id.
113.
Id.
69(8). Other directors of CONEMPA filed a criminal complaint
against Canese for defamation. Id.
69(10).
114.
Id.
2. This restriction that could be lifted only under extraordinary
circumstances. Id.
115.
Id. 5.
116.
Id.
10.
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the case to the Inter-American Court. While the case was pending
before the Inter-American Court, the Supreme Court of Justice of
Paraguay annulled the judgment against Canese and absolved him of
guilt. 117 The Inter-American Court subsequently issued a decision
holding that Canese's right to freedom of expression as protected by
the American Convention had been violated."l 8 The Inter-American
Court held that criminal prosecution for defamation was unduly
restrictive for statements made in the context of political
119
campaigns.
In PalamaraIribarne,a former military intelligence officer who
had written a State-censored book on military intelligence, also had
been convicted in a Chilean military court of criminal defamation for
comments that he made to the press about the department that was
prosecuting his case. Following the seizure of Palamara Iribarne's
book the defendant told the press that the office of the Naval
Prosecutor "had limited [Palamara Iribarne's] freedom of expression
and had apparently tried to cover up the repression by accusing him
of failure to follow military orders and duties.' 120 He also stated that
"there were reasons to assume that the Office of the Naval Prosecutor
had forged legal documents and lied to the Court of Appeals when it
was consulted with respect to who made the complaint that initiated
the summary proceeding and the case number so as to avoid an
unfavorable decision."''1 1 The commander of the naval zone filed a
complaint against Palamara Iribarne for the crime of desacato stating
that Palamara Iribarne had made his statements "in highly offensive
terms with respect to the Naval Prosecutor."'1 22 Although Palamara
Iribarne was initially absolved of the crime of defamation before a
military tribunal, 12 3 he was subsequently convicted by another
military tribunal and that decision was confirmed by the Chilean
Supreme Court. 124 The case was then brought to the Commission

117.
Id. $ 69(49). In annulling the sentences against Canese and absolving him
of guilt, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay stated,
[tihe statements made by Mr. Canese-in the political context of an election
campaign for the presidency-were, necessarily, important in a democratic
society working towards a participative and pluralist power structure, a matter
of public interest. There is nothing more important and public than the popular
discussion on and subsequent election of the President of the Republic.
Id. 9 99 (quoting the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay).
118.

Id.

108.

119.
Id. $T 91-92.
120.
Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135,
63(73) (Nov. 22, 2005).
121.
Id. $ 63(73).
122.
Id. T 63(74).
123.
Id. T 63(88).
124.
Id. 63(91), (93).
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which found in favor of Palamara Iribarne, and it was then referred
to the Inter-American Court. Chile informed the Court that it had
revised its desacato law in civil courts to eliminate the crime of
defamation against authorities. 125 The State had not, however,
126
eliminated defamation from the Chilean Code of Military Justice.
The Inter-American Court held that Chile had violated Palamara
Iribarne's right to freedom of expression because the crime of
desacato was disproportionate and unnecessary in a democratic
society. 127 The Court stated that the law as applied to Palamara
Iribarne "established disproportionate sanctions for criticizing the
functioning and members of a State institution,"128 in that it
"suppressed the essential debate for the functioning of a truly
democratic system and unnecessarily restricted the right to freedom
1 29
of thought and expression."'
2.

Higher Level of Protection for Statements about Persons Engaged
in Activities of Public Interest

If governmental impunity and corruption are to be defeated,
citizens must be allowed to criticize the actions of public officials
without fear of criminal prosecution. The Inter-American Court
specifies that domestic laws must provide a higher level of protection
from defamation suits for statements made about a person whose
activities are within the domain of public interest. 30 In this regard,
the Court stated that
[t]hose individuals who have an influence on matters of public interest
have laid themselves open voluntarily to a more intense public scrutiny
and, consequently, in this domain, they are subject to a higher risk of
being criticized, because their activities go beyond the private sphere
131
and belong to the realm of public debate.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

63(101).
88.

129
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107,
130.
(Jul. 2, 2004). The Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression
states that "[tihe protection of a person's reputation should only be guaranteed through
civil sanctions in those cases in which the person offended is a public official, a public
person or a private person who has voluntarily become involved in matters of public
interest." Declarationof Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle
10.
129; Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru,
131.
Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, 155 (Feb. 6, 2001) The Inter-American Court
stated approvingly that the European Court of Human Rights has emphasized that
"freedom of expression leaves a very reduced margin to any restriction of political
discussion or discussion of matters of public interest." Ivcher Bronstein, 2001 Inter-
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The Court explained that the differing standard of protection is not
based on whether the subject is a public figure or private citizen;
instead, it is based on whether a given person's activities are matters
that fall within the domain of public interest. 132 Persons involved in
such activities should have a greater tolerance and openness to
criticism. 133 To date, the Inter-American Court has specifically
acknowledged this protection for statements made about honorary
diplomats, 134 candidates for office, 135 and officers and members of the
136
military, including those serving on tribunals.
In light of the essential function of public debate in a democracy,
the Inter-American Court held that statements questioning the
competence and suitability of a candidate made during an electoral
campaign concerned matters of public interest. 137 The Court stated
that a greater margin of tolerance should be shown towards
statements and opinions expressed during political debates. 138 The
Court reasoned that not only during elections but also in general
[t]he democratic oversight that society exercises through public opinion
encourages transparency in the business of the State and promotes a
sense of responsibility in public officials as regards their function,

Am. Ct. H.R.,
155. The European Court stated in this regard that the "acceptable
limits to criticism are broader with regard to the Government than in relation to the
private citizen or even a politician." Ivcher Bronstein, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
155
(quoting Sirek & Ozdemir v. Turkey, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50,
60 (1999)). In a
democratic system, the acts or omissions of the Government would be subject to
rigorous examination, not only by the legislative and judicial authorities, but also by
public opinion." Id.
132.
HerreraUlloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 7 129.
133.
Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, T 83
(Nov. 22, 2005)(citing Canese v. Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111, 7
97 (Aug. 31, 2004)); Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 127.
134.
HerreraUlloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 3.
135.
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 97.
136.
PalamaraIribarne,2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 83.
137.
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 77 91-92. The Court specified that, "[t]he
effective exercise of representative democracy" underlies the enjoyment of human
rights." Advisory Opinion OC 6/86, 1986 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6, 32 (May 9,
1986). The Court, moreover, rejected the view that the form of government does not
affect State compliance with human rights standards. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 5,
42 (Nov. 13, 1985). The Court also affirmed that,
"[flreedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic
society rests." Id.
138.
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 97 (citing HerreraUlloa, 2004 Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R.,
127); see Ivcher Bronstein, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.; Feldek v. Slovakia,
2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. 463; Surek & Ozdemir v. Turkey, 1999 Eur. Ct. H.R. 50,
60
(1999).
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which is why there should be so little margin for any restriction of
139
political discourse on matters of public interest.

The public's participation in the interests of society is encouraged by
allowing the exercise of democratic control through freedom of
expression. 140 In Canese, the Inter-American Court stated that
"[e]veryone must be allowed to question and investigate the
competence and suitability of the candidates, and also to disagree
with and compare proposals, ideas and opinions, so that the
electorate may form its opinion in order to vote.' 14 1 Likewise, the
European Court of Human Rights has stated that it is "particularly
and
important in the period preceding an election that opinions
142
freely."
circulate
to
permitted
are
kinds
all
of
information
The Inter-American Court should establish a standard that
domestic courts could apply in determining whether a restriction
related to a person's public activities violates freedom of expression.

83; Canese, 2004 Inter-Am.
139.
PalamaraIribarne,2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
127 (citing Ivcher Bronstein,
97; Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Ct. H.R.,
2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 155) [translation by Author].
70, quoted in Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85,
140.
82. The Inter-American
112 and in Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Ct. H.R.,
Democratic Charter states that, "[tiransparency in government activities, probity,
responsible public administration on the part of governments, respect for social rights,
and freedom of expression and of the press are essential components of the exercise of
democracy." Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 4 quoted by the Court in Herrera
115. Likewise, the Council of Europe stated that,
Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
"[f]reedom to inform and to be informed is one of the cornerstones of democracy." Denis
Durand de Bousingen, Introduction to KARACA, supra note 1, at 9.
90. The Inter-American Court stated
Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
141.
that it
considers it important to emphasize that, within the framework of an electoral
campaign, the two dimensions of freedom of thought and expression are the
cornerstone for the debate during the electoral process, since they become an
essential instrument for the formation of public opinion among the electorate,
strengthen the political contest between the different candidates and parties
taking part in the elections, and are an authentic mechanism for analyzing the
political platforms proposed by the different candidates. This leads to greater
transparency, and better control over the future authorities and their
administration.
Id. 88. The European Court of Human Rights has also called for latitude for freedom
of expression within the context of politics, stating that
[w]hile precious to all, freedom of expression is particularly important for
political parties and their active members .... They represent their electorate,
draw attention to their preoccupations and defend their interests. Accordingly,
interferences with the freedom of expression of a politician who is a member of
an opposition party, like the applicant, call for the closest scrutiny on the
Court's part.
Incal v. Turkey, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R. 48, 46).
Bowman v. The United Kingdon, 1998 Eur. Ct, H.R. 4,
142.

42.
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In Canese, the Inter-American Court made only a general statement
that a judge should weigh "respect for the rights or reputations of
others against the value for a democratic society of an open debate on
topics of public interest or concern." 143 In Herrera, the Court stated
that "a certain latitude" should be allowed under the American
Convention for statements made about public officials or other public
figures when matters of public interest are involved. 144 The Court
explained that this does not "signify that the honor of public officials
or public figures should not be legally protected, but that it should be
protected in accordance with the principles of democratic
pluralism.' 145 The European Court of Human Rights also held that a
public official who "lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every
word and deed" must show "a greater degree of tolerance.' 146 The
European Court of Human Rights has not established the elements of
this threshold of protection.
It would benefit international jurisprudence on freedom of
expression and assist domestic courts if the Inter-American Court
were to set forth a test to be applied in defamation cases, especially
when the complainant is a person engaged in public activities. The
Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression
suggests the use of such a test. 14 7 It advocates that "it must be proven
that in disseminating the news, the social communicator had the
specific intent to inflict harm, was fully aware that false news was
disseminated, or acted with gross negligence in efforts to determine
the truth or falsity of such news.' 148 The U.S. Supreme Court and
other jurisdictions throughout the world have adopted the "actual
malice" test. 14 9 Supporters of a free press argue that "the 'actual
malice' standard is necessary because stories of official corruption or
wrongdoing should not be suppressed simply because a reporter who
has done a sound investigation is insufficiently certain of being able

143.
144.

Canese, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
105.
HerreraUlloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,

145.

Id.

128.

146.
Dichand et. al. v. Austria, 2002 Eur. Ct. H.R., Application No. 29271/95, 26
February 2002,
39. The European Court of Human Rights also applies a different
standard to "restrictions applicable when the object of the expression is an individual
and when reference is made to a public person." Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8
Eur. H.R. Rep. 407, 42 (1986). In this regard, the European Court stated that "[t]he
limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than
as regards a private individual." Id.
147.
Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supranote 35, Principle
10.
148.

Id.

149.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964); see Herrera
Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 66(e) (citing Spanish Penal Code arts. 204, 207.
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to prove the facts to risk criminal prosecution."' 150 Alternatively, the
Court could have adopted the standard of lack of good faith that has
been adopted by other domestic jurisdictions. Despite some resistance
in Latin America to importing a foreign standard, a clearer rule
would benefit freedom of expression and democracy.
3. Alternate Remedy for Defamation: Civil Suits
The Inter-American Court has consistently held that criminal
defamation suits and the sanctions resulting from a conviction for
criminal defamation are unnecessary and disproportionate, and are
therefore an illegal restriction on freedom of expression when the
statement concerns a person engaged in public activities. 151 The
Court has not yet addressed the issue of whether criminal defamation
suits and sanctions are necessary and proportionate when statements
are made about a person whose activities are not in the public sphere.
Criminal suits for defamation to remedy damage to a person's
honor and reputation should be deemed to be unnecessary in all
cases. Civil law suits for defamation combined with the right to reply
can provide restitutio integrum (full restitution) to victims. Civil
defamation suits are adjudicated between the parties in civil courts,
whereas criminal defamation suits are prosecuted by the State as
criminal offenses. Otherwise, the primary distinction between civil
and criminal defamation is in the remedies awarded. The victim's
remedy in a civil defamation suit is compensatory damages and
is
perhaps punitive damages. 15 2 The formal remedy in criminal libel 153
incarceration or the payment of a fine to the government.
Furthermore, civil defamation suits are not as problematic as
criminal defamation suits. In civil suits, there is no potential for
exercise
prosecutors
As criminal
prosecutorial misconduct.
considerable discretion in determining which complaints to prosecute,
criminal defamation laws may be inconsistently enforced, and

150.
Brief of Open Society Justice Initiative as Amicus Curiae Supporting The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case Herrera Ulloa (on file with
the Court).
151.
Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135, 88;
91-92.
Canese v. Paraguay, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 111,
152.
A problem that may arise in a civil defamation suit is the award of
disproportionate damages. See Stokes v. Jamaica, Case 28/04, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 65/04, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 at 396 (2004). A civil defamation suit is
less stigmatizing, but stigma and punishment are often what the alleged victim is
seeking. See Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in
American Jurisprudence,9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 433, 470 (2004).
One advantage of criminal libel is that the state pays all the costs and
153.
expenses of the litigation, whereas the person who files a civil suit must pay attorney
fees and court costs.
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enforcement may by politically motivated, especially when the alleged
victim of the statement is a public official or influential person.
Another problem arises when criminal defamation proceedings
are instituted by private parties rather than by prosecutors, as is
legal in some States. For instance, in Costa Rica, crimes against a
person's honor were prosecuted by the alleged victim. 154 Under these
statutes a person who considered himself or herself defamed could
institute criminal proceedings and take the case to court without the
involvement of a public prosecutor. Consequently, frivolous
complaints could result in trial, because no public official reviewed
the complaint or the evidence to determine if prosecution was
warranted.
The Inter-American Court did not utilize the opportunities in the
Canese, Herrera Ulloa, and Palamara Iribarne cases to further
advance international jurisprudence on freedom of expression by
stating unequivocally that defamation should be a civil offense in all
cases, and that criminal defamation laws per se are not a
proportionate restriction on freedom of expression under the
American Convention. The Court has the authority under the
American Convention to order a State to repeal a law that violates
rights protected by the Convention. 15 5 Although States are commonly
allowed a margin of appreciation in drafting laws, the laws must
ultimately comply with the State's international human rights
obligations. The Court could have ordered the States to repeal their
criminal defamation laws. Alternately, the Court could have held that
these laws lack legal effect because they contravene the American
Convention, as it did in reference to Peru's amnesty laws. 15 6 Criminal
penalties for defamation should be eliminated except in cases
involving a "direct and immediate incitement to acts of violence,
discrimination or hostility."'1 7 The result of the Court's failure to
declare criminal defamation laws per se in violation of the American
Convention is that persons alleging that they have been defamed may
continue to bring cases in criminal court even though they will not
likely win convictions. 158 If the Court were to rule that criminal

154.
155.

Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 66(e).
American Convention, supra note 13, arts. 2, 63(l); see JO M. PASQUALUCCI,

THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

245-48 (2003).
156. See Barrios Altos v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C) No. 75,
44
(Mar. 14, 2001).
157. Press Release, Human Rights Watch: Human Rights News, Guatemala:
Acquittal of Human Rights Defender a Victory for Free Expression (Feb. 2, 2004),
http://hrw.org/englishldocsl2004lO2/02/guatem7210.htm [hereinafter Guatemala: Acquittal
of Human Rights Defender].
158.
For example, in May 2005, a Brazilian sports commentator was convicted of
defamation and ordered to spend 18 months of overnight detention in a prison
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defamation statutes per se violate freedom of expression, the Court
would, thereby, eliminate the egregious use of such laws.
4. Alternate Remedy: Right to Reply
The reputation of a person who has been libeled can be protected
through the right of reply following a victorious civil suit. The right of
reply may require the publisher or broadcaster responsible for the
defamatory statement to print or broadcast the reply of the victim or
the court's judgment in the victim's favor. The American Convention
provides that "[a]nyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements
or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated
medium of communication has the right to reply or to make a
correction using the same communication outlet, under such
1 59
conditions as the law may establish.'
The Inter-American Court stated that there is an inescapable
relationship between the right of reply or correction and the right to
freedom of expression; this relationship is evidenced by the placement
of the right of reply immediately after the right to freedom of
expression in the American Convention. 160 The Court further stated
that "in regulating the application of the right of reply or correction,
the State's Parties must respect the right of freedom of expression
guaranteed by Article 13. They may not, however, interpret the right
of freedom of expression so broadly as to negate the right of reply
proclaimed by Article 14(1).161 Although the European Convention

dormitory far from the television station where he broadcast. See Journalist Gets 18
Months Detention on Defamation Charge, CPJ 2005 NEWS ALERT, May 17, 2005,
http://www.cpj.org/news/2OO5/Brazill7mayO5na.html. The sports commentator had
made a veiled allegation of corruption when he alleged that certain stations had won
the right to broadcast a soccer tournament because of their relationship to the
government. Id. The media groups filed criminal complaints against the sports
broadcaster, and he was subsequently convicted. Id.
159.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 14(1). The Argentine Supreme
Court has held that there is a directly enforceable right to reply in Argentina without
the need for supporting domestic legislation. See Thomas Buergenthal, International
Tribunals and National Courts: The Internationalizationof Domestic Adjudication, in
RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG 687, 695 (1995).
The Argentine
Supreme Court based the righty to reply in Argentina on Article 14 of the American
Convention and the Court's advisory opinion on the Enforceability of the Right to
Reply. See id.
160.
Advisory Opinion OC-7/86, 1986 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.A) No. 7,
25
(Aug. 29, 1986).
161.
Id. International treaties and the courts that interpret them generally
allow contracting states a margin of appreciation in implementing the right to reply.
See id. For instance, international law does not dictate the amount of space required
for the reply or the time frame in which the reply must be published. See id. 27. The
State may establish explicit provisions in its domestic laws. See id. When a court holds
that the media must publish the entire court decision, the right of reply can be onerous
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does not provide for a right of reply, the European Committee of
Ministers is said to have "pioneered the concept of a right of reply in
'162
the press and on radio and television.
Another remedy for defamation would be a reprimand by a
professional body or organization of the journalist or publication that
printed the defamatory statement.1 6 3 Care must be taken, however,
that the professional body not be a tool of the government to silence
journalists. The organization should be composed of professionals in
the field.
5. Burden of Proof and Defenses in Defamation Actions
In some States a person making a defamatory statement may be
punished even if the statement is true. In other States, although
truth is a defense to defamation, the defendant has the burden of
proving that the statement was true. Moreover, domestic law may
require that the defendant prove the truth of statements cited from
other printed sources or prove the truth of value judgments made
about a person. These allocations of the burden of proof are in
contrast to the general rule that the plaintiff in civil proceedings or
the State in criminal proceedings has the burden of proving that a
wrongful act has been committed. 164 In defamation proceedings it
should be required that the plaintiff prove the defendant made a
statement that was damaging to the plaintiffs reputation, the
statement was false, and if it was published, that it was published
intentionally or negligently. 165 In such cases, if the plaintiff did not
prove that the statement was false, the case would fail. The burden of
establishing the falsity of an allegedly defamatory statement should
be on the party bringing the action for defamation, at least when the
statement involves a person engaged in matters of public interest. In

to the media. See Lanao, supra note 96, at 347, 353 (citing the Criminal Code of Costa
Rica, art. 155). The court decisions often cover several newspaper pages. Id. at 354.
Some commentators argue that the victim's reply should be granted the same degree of
prominence provided the original statement and should be published free of charge and
within a reasonable amount of time after the right of reply is established. See John
Hayes, The Right to Reply: A Conflict of Fundamental Rights, 37 COL. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 551, 551 (2004).
162.
KARACA, supra note 1, at 13.
163.
RIGHTS VS. REPUTATIONS, supra note 97.
164.
ZELEZNY, supra note 10, at 117. Under U.S. law, the plaintiff in a libel suit
has the burden of proof as to all elements of a law suit including the falsity of the
statement. Id. Traditionally under U.S. common law, truth had been a defense to libel,
meaning that the defendant (person accused of making a defamatory statement) had
the burden of proving the truth of the statement. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court's
decisions have now generally placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove the falsehood
of the statement. Id. at 126.
165.
RIGHTS VS. REPUTATIONS, supra note 97.
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a joint declaration, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the
Media, and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
stated that "the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving the falsity
1 66
of any statements of fact on matters of public concern."'
A problem arises in States that place the burden on the
defendant to prove that allegedly defamatory statements are true.
For example, the Costa Rican law in question in the Herrera Ulloa
case put the burden on the defendant to prove the truth of the
statements at issue. 167 Likewise in Chile, a person who makes a
statement alleged to be defamatory had to prove that the statement
was true. 168 In a Chilean case that has not come before the InterAmerican Court, a former political prisoner claimed in a television
interview that she had been sexually abused by a Chilean police
officer. 169
The woman was subsequently convicted of criminal

166.
Joint Declaration by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the OAS
Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, International Mechanisms for
Promoting Freedom of Expression (2004), http://www.cidh.org/relatoria/showarticle.
asp?artID=319&11D=l. The U.S. Supreme Court also rejected the requirement that the
defendant prove the truth of allegations concerning public officials as a violation of free
speech. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme Court
stated that "[u]nder such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred
from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is
in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of
having to do so." Id. at 279. U.S. law requires that when an alleged defamatory
statement concerns public officials, the plaintiff not only bears the burden of proving
the falsity of the statements but also of proving that the statements were published in
malice or with reckless disregard for the truth. Id at 279-80.
167.
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, 132
(Jul. 2, 2004). The Costa Rican statute in question in Herrera Ulloa provided that
"[t]he person who dishonors another or who spreads rumors or news of a kind that will
affect his reputation, shall be punished with a fine .
Penal Code of Costa Rica,
Title II, art. 46. The law goes on to state that
[i]nsult or defamation is not punishable if it consists of a truthful statement
and has not been motivated by the pure desire to offend or by a spirit of malice.
Notwithstanding, the accused may prove the truthfulness of the allegation
only: 1. If the allegation is linked to the defense of a matter of current public
interest; and 2. If the plaintiff demands proof of the allegation against him,
provided that such proof does not affect the rights or secrets of third persons.
Id. The law goes on to state that "[a] defendant accused of libel or defamation may
prove the truthfulness of the imputed fact or deed, unless the injured party has not
lodged a complaint, where such action is required in order to prosecute." Article 152 of
the Costa Rican Penal Code states, "[a]nyone who publishes or reproduces, by any
means, offences against honor by another party shall be punished as having committed
those offences. (Unofficial translations from Article 19 brief to the Inter-American
Court.).
168.
Chile: Former Political Prisoner Convicted of Defamation, supra note 95.
169.
Id.
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defamation 170 when the police officer brought a criminal proceeding
against her, and she bore the burden of proving that her allegations
were true. There were no witnesses to the assault. The Chilean Court
held that she had failed to satisfy the burden of proof and convicted
her of libel. She was given a two-month suspended prison sentence,
fined $1000, and ordered to pay damages. 171 As shown by this case,
the allocation of the burden of proof can significantly affect the
outcome of a trial.
A defendant should never be required to prove the absolute truth
of a statement. Journalists, especially, should not be held to a
standard of strict liability for broadcasting or publishing a statement
that turns out to be false. The media may make mistakes. If the
media were liable for every error, it would undermine the right to
freedom of expression and inhibit the publication of news. The NGO,
"Article 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression" posits a
"reasonableness" defense under which the media would be absolved of
liabilitity for defamation upon a showing that under all the
circumstances of the case, it was reasonable to have published the
172
false statements.
The Inter-American Court did not take the opportunity to hold
that the burden of proof must be on the plaintiff when the statement
concerns a matter of public interest. The Court did not address the
issue in the Canese case, and it limited itself to a narrower holding on
the issue in the Herrera Ulloa case. 173 In Hererra Ulloa, the Court
held that placing the burden on the defendant journalist to prove the
truth of third party statements, facts that had initially been reported
in the European press, was an excessive limitation on freedom of
expression. 174 The Court reasoned that the effect of placing the
burden of proof on the defendant in that case would have a
"deterrent, chilling and inhibiting effect on all those who practice
journalism," and would "obstruct public debate on issues of interest to
society. '175 It was unclear from the Inter-American Court's decision

170.

Id.

171.
Id.
172.
Article 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression, Amicus brief, Defamation
8, 144-63 (March 2004) in the
Law as a Restriction on Freedom of Expression
HerreraUlloa case.
132-35.
173.
HerreraUlloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
132-35. Most of the statements
174.
Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
were actually reproductions of portions of news articles printed in the Belgian press.
Id. The European Court likewise has held that "punishment of a journalist for assisting
in the dissemination of statements made by another person ... would seriously hamper
the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest." Thoma v.
62.
Luxemburg, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R. _,
175.
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107,
133. The European Court has also held that "freedom of expression requires that care
be taken to dissociate the personal views of the writer of the commentary from the
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whether any law that places the burden on the defendant to prove the
truth of statements would violate the American Convention, or
whether there is a violation only if the journalist must prove the
truth of statements that have been quoted. Thus, due to the Court's
lack of clarification, other persons must be domestically convicted of
criminal defamation and fail to prove the truth of their statements
before the Inter-American Court will go a step further to clarify the
law in this area.
In some States even the truth of the alleged defamatory
statement is not a defense. For example, the Executive Director of
Casa Alianza, a home for street children in Guatemala, was convicted
of criminal defamation for accusing certain Guatemalan lawyers of
involvement in irregular adoptions. 176 One of the lawyers he had
named brought a private action for criminal defamation against the
director. 77 In Guatemala it was a criminal offense to make a
statement that "dishonors, discredits, or disparages another person,"
even if the statement is true.' 178 A person convicted of criminal
179
defamation in Guatemala could receive up to five years in prison.
The Inter-American Court has to date declined to address the issue of
whether truth is a valid defense in such an action. It should clarify
that truth is always a defense to a charge of defamation.
The Inter-American Court did not find that requiring the
defendant in a criminal case to prove the truth of news articles
quoted from the foreign press violated the right to a presumption of
innocence. 80 The Court did not provide an analysis or reasoning for
its decision, finding only a violation of the defendant's right to
freedom of expression.' 8 ' Other sources argue that requiring the
defendant to bear the burden of proof in criminal cases is a violation
18 2
of the right to a presumption of innocence.

ideas that are being discussed or reviewed even though these ideas may be considered
offensive to many or even to amount to an apologia for violence." Halis v. Turkey, 2005
Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 134.
176.
Guatemala: Acquittal of Human Rights Defender, supra note 157.
177.
Id.
178.
Id. Historically, "[tlruth was not allowed as a defense in criminal libel
cases, because the purpose of the prosecution of the crime was to prevent violence."
Lisby, supra note 152, at 456.
179.
Guatemala: Acquittal of Human Rights Defender, supra note 157.
180.
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107, 178
(Jul. 2, 2004). Article 8(2) of the American Convention provides in relevant part that
"[elvery person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so
long as his guilt has not been proven according to law." American Convention, supra
note 13, art. 8(2).
181.
Herrera Ulloa, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R,
176-178.
182.
Article 19, Global Campaign for Free Expression, Defamation Law as a
Restriction on Freedom of Expression; Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting Applicant in
Herrera Ulloa (on file with the Court).
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6. No Defamation for Value Judgments
The Inter-American Court has not yet been called upon to
determine whether a person has been defamed when the speaker or
writer has simply published a negative value judgment or opinion
about an individual. Value judgments are expressions of opinions
about the subject such as "he is competent" or "she is not trustworthy." Whereas a fact is susceptible of proof, a value judgment is
not and, therefore, a value judgment should not be judged
defamatory. The American Convention, unlike the European
Convention, does not expressly protect an individual's right to hold
opinions.' 8 3 Nonetheless, the right to express opinions should be
considered to be subsumed within the right to express ideas, a right
that is protected by the American Convention.
The European Court of Human Rights has ruled that Austrian
courts violated the European Convention's provision on freedom of
expression when they held that value judgments and personal
opinions were defamatory under domestic law. In the Lingens case,
an Austrian journalist had been convicted in the domestic courts for
using the expressions "the basest opportunism," "immoral," and
"undignified" in reference to the Chancellor of Austria.18 4 The
European Court of Human Rights found that the statements were not
defamatory, reasoning that "a careful distinction needs to be made
between facts and value-judgments. The existence of facts can be
demonstrated, but the truth of value-judgments is not susceptible of
proof."'18 5 Should the Inter-American Court be confronted by a similar
issue, it should follow the jurisprudence of the European Court and
hold that value judgments and opinions are protected by the
American Convention's right to express ideas of all kinds. To be
defamatory, a statement must state or imply assertions of facts which
are capable of being proven false.
B. Restrictionsfor the Protection of NationalSecurity
The American Convention allows freedom of expression to be
subsequently restricted for "the protection of national security, public
order, or public health or morals. ' 18 6 It must be noted that even when

183.
Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedom specifies that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas." European Convention, supra note 37.
184.
Lingens v. Austria, App. No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407,
22, 45
(1986).
185.
Id.
186.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13(2)(b).
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publication or speech threatens these grounds the American
Convention does not authorize prior censorship. The issue is only
whether any of the stated grounds will justify the subsequent liability
of the party making the statement. In the PalamaraIribarne case,
Chile argued that the publication of the book in question would
jeopardize national security.' 8 7 However, as State experts affirmed
that the information in the book was public knowledge, and the State
was arguing to justify prior censorship, the Court did not address the
defense.' 88
The Inter-American Court has not had a further
opportunity to develop jurisprudence related to this restriction of
freedom of expression.
Other international treaties also include permissible restrictions
to freedom of expression on the grounds of national security and
related factors, and these restrictions have been interpreted in other
international fora. The European Convention allows for restrictions
"in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals ....
",189 Similarly, the ICCPR permits restrictions
"for the protection of national security, or of public order, or of public
health or morals."'190 The European Court of Human Rights and the
UNHRC have developed jurisprudence to determine whether
interference with freedom of expression is justified on grounds
concerning national security and related factors. 191 The jurisprudence
of both bodies incorporate the same three elements set forth in the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court when it considers the
legitimacy of any restriction on freedom of expression. These
elements are that the restriction be (1) prescribed by a national law,
(2) made pursuant to one of the legitimate aims set forth in the
19 2
applicable treaty, and (3) necessary.

187.
Palamara Iribarne v. Chile, 2005 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 135,
66(b) (Nov. 22, 2005).
188.
Id. 75.
189.
European Convention, supra note 37, art. 10(2).
190.
ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 19(3)(b). The African Charter on Human and
People's Rights does not set forth any explicit restrictions to the freedom of Expression.
However, the Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression in Africa, which was
adopted by the African Commission on Human and People's Rights, provides that
"expression should not be restricted on public order or national security grounds unless
there is a real risk of harm to a legitimate interest and there is a close causal link
between the risk of harm and the expression." African Commission on Human and
People's Rights, Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression in Africa (Oct.
2002),
available
at
http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/resour/
40303aufoe.asp?sector=RESOUR&range-start=l.
191.
Halis v. Turkey, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3,
134; Kim v. Republic of Korea,
U.N. Human Rights Commission, CCPRIC/64/D/574/1994, 64th Sess. (Jan. 4, 1999).
192.
Sener v. Turkey, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 377,
28; Kim v. Republic of Korea,
U.N. Human Rights Commission, CCPRIC/64/D/574/1994, 64th Sess.,
12.2 (Jan. 4,
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Enforcement bodies have focused largely on the third element of
the "necessity" of the restriction when holding that the restriction
193
contravened the State's obligations under international law.
National security laws are often drafted in broad and unspecific
terms which could allow for State enforcement for any speech or
activity which criticizes or can be viewed as threatening to the
government in power. 194 These laws, when used to stifle dissent, may
serve as effective tools to muffle criticism of governmental policies
and to subvert democracy. The international enforcement bodies that
oversee State compliance with human rights treaties must carefully
scrutinize State arguments that an interference with freedom of
expression is justified by such laws. When a State defends its
interference with freedom of expression on national security grounds,
the State should be required to "specify the precise nature of the
threat allegedly posed by the author's exercise of freedom of
expression." 195 The State should also be required to explain
specifically why the interference is necessary to protect national
security or public order. 196 Marks and Clapham accurately posit that
the protection of national security "while incontestably significant, is
absolutely vague and generally rooted in considerations that are not
publicly verifiable."'1 9 7 State reliance on these grounds must be
carefully scrutinized.
When Turkey attempted to justify its interference with
journalists' rights to freedom of expression on national security
grounds, the European Court of Human Rights resolved the
journalists' complaints against the State by applying the abovereferenced test. 198 In Halis v. Turkey the Turkish government
imprisoned a journalist for publishing a book review that expressed
positive opinions about aspects of the Kurdish separatist
movement. 19 9 The journalist was convicted domestically of violating
the Turkish Prevention of Terrorism Act through the dissemination of
20 0
propaganda about an illegal separatist terrorist organization.

1999). The European Court requires that the restriction be "necessary in a democratic
society." Sener, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 377, 28. The U.N. Human Rights Commission
requires that the restriction be "necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose." Kim, U.N.
Human Rights Commission, CCPRIC/641D/57411994, 12.2.
193.
Halis v. Turkey, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3,
9-12.
194.

SUSAN MARKS

& ANDREW CLAPHAM,

INTERNATIONAL

HUMAN

RIGHTS

LEXICON 243 (2005).
195.
Kim v. Republic of Korea, U.N. Human Rights Commission,
CCPRC/64/D/574/1994, 64th Sess., 12.5 (Jan. 4, 1999).
196.
Id.
197.
MARKS & CLAPHAM, supra note 194, at 243.
198.
Halis v. Turkey, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3; Sener v. Turkey, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R.
377.
199.
Halis v. Turkey, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3,
9-12.
200.
Id.
13-15, 17.
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When the journalist filed a complaint with the European Court of
Human Rights, the State defended that its restriction was necessary
to protect national security. 20 1 The Court found that the restriction
was made pursuant to Turkish law and that in view of the sensitive
security situation and the use of violence by a separatist movement in
Turkey, the measures taken by the government had the legitimate
aim of protecting national security and public safety. 20 2 The Court did
not find, however, that the conviction and suspended sentence of the
journalist were proportionate to the interference with his freedom of
expression. 203 Thus, the European Court of Human Rights held that
the restriction was not necessary in a democratic society and that it,
20 4
therefore, violated the journalist's right to freedom of expression.
Similarly, in $ener v. Turkey, before the European Court of
Human Rights, the owner and editor of a weekly Turkish paper was
convicted of "disseminat[ing] propaganda against the State" for
publishing an article that referred to the military attacks on the
Kurdish population as genocide. 20 5 Turkey again defended its
interference with freedom of speech on national security grounds
because, in its view, merely by speaking negatively of the violence
against the Kurdish population, the applicant had "incited and
encouraged violence against the State. ''20 6 The European Court of
Human Rights held that the State had violated the applicant's right
to freedom of expression. 20 7 Likewise, the UNHRC held that South
Korea had contravened the ICCPR's provision on freedom of
expression when it convicted and imprisoned a South Korean activist
for criticizing the government of South Korea and advocating national
reunification. 20 8 The government had convicted the complainant of
20 9
violating its National Security Law.
When determining whether governmental restrictions on
freedom of speech for reasons such as national security or public
order are legitimate, the Inter-American Court should apply similar
principles to those applied in such cases by the European Court of
Human Rights and the UNHRC. The Court should first look at the
restriction in light of the case as a whole, including the content of the
speech that was restricted within the overall context of the country at

201.
Id.
202.
Id.
26-27.
203.
Id.
33, 37-39.
204.
Id.
205.
Sener, 2000 Eur. Ct. H.R. 377,
7-8.
206.
Id.
37.
207.
Id.
208.
Kim v. Republic of Korea, U.N. Human Rights
CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994, 64th Sess., 2.1-2.3, 12.5 (Jan. 4, 1999).
209.
Id.
2.3.

Commission,
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that time. 210 The Court must also specifically determine whether the
interference with freedom of expression was "proportionate to the
legitimate aims pursued" and whether the reasons used by the
government to restrict freedom of speech were "relevant and
sufficient. '211 As explained by the Council of Europe, "[t]he right to
information takes precedence over the political, legal and economic
imperatives which are sometimes given as reasons for restricting
it."

212

C. Indirect Restrictionson the Media not Permissible
A State may not substitute indirect means to restrict the
freedom of the media to express diverse views. The American
Convention states that the
right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means,
such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint,
radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination
of information, or by any other means tending to impede the
2 13
communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.

This provision insightfully preempts more subtle means of restricting
freedom of expression. Neither the European Convention nor the
ICCPR contains a similar explicit provision. The Inter-American
Court pointed out that the drafters intentionally located the
limitation on indirect restrictions immediately following the provision
on permissible restrictions to insure that the Convention's language
on permissible restrictions not be misinterpreted to limit, more than
214
strictly necessary, the scope of freedom of expression.
Under the American Convention, it is incompatible for the State
to use public funds to favor one media competitor, to punish those
who do not espouse the governmental position, or to attempt to
influence the media to broadcast or print information favorable to the
government. Thus, a State would violate the American Convention if
it granted government loans on a discriminatory basis or used State
funds to advertise only on those stations or in those newspapers that
publish or broadcast information favorable to the government.
Furthermore, the State could not use its power to grant concessions of
radio or television frequencies, custom duties privileges, or any other

210.
Halis v. Turkey, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 33.
211.
Id.
212.
KARACA, supra note 1, at 9.
213.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13(3).
214.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 5,
(Nov. 13, 1985).
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privileges that would result in a threat to freedom of expression.
The State's obligations in this area are not only negative; the State
also must ensure that indirect restrictions on freedom of expression
are not imposed by "private controls," meaning by private parties,
which would "impede the communication and circulation of ideas and
opinions." 216 The Inter-American Declaration states that "the means
of communication have the right to carry out their role in an
independent manner. Direct or indirect pressures exerted upon
journalists or other social communicators to stifle the dissemination
217
of information are incompatible with freedom of expression.
D. Propagandafor War and Hate Speech Punishable
A question exists as to whether the censorship of hate speech
would violate the American Convention. The American Convention
provides that
any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to
any other similar action against any person or group of persons on any
grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national
218
origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.

The initial draft of this provision was broader, reading "[a]ny
propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law, as shall any advocacy
of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility, crime or violence." 219 The U.S. delegation to
the drafting convention objected to this provision, arguing that it
should be deleted because it required censorship and could conflict
with the U.S. protection of freedom of speech. 220 The Brazilian
delegate, the renowned international law scholar Carlos Dunshee de
Abranches, clarified that the provision even as then drafted did "not
say that censorship must be established, but rather that the law shall
prohibit a certain type of activity. '22 1 The U.S. delegation could not
garner support to drop the provision, so, in consultation with

215.

Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle

13.
216.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 48.
217.
Id.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 13(5).
218.
219.
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL & ROBERT NORRIS, Legislative History, in 2 HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, booklet 12, at 89. The provision on freedom of
expression was originally Article 12(5). See id.
220.
Id. at 88. The U.S. delegate also stated, "[i]nsofar as propaganda for war, a
series of classical works such as Homer's Iliad, a good part of the works of Shakespeare
and of St. Thomas Aquinas, in which there is propaganda for war, would be prohibited
by law." Id.
221.
Id. at 89.
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delegates of other countries, the United States put forward a
proposed amendment which was accepted and resulted in the current
provision. The report of the U.S. delegation commented that the
wording that resulted in the final provision was guided by the U.S.
Supreme Court decision, Brandenburg v.Ohio.222 Brandenburg set
forth the principle that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
'223
to incite or produce such action.
The Inter-American Court has not yet been presented with the
opportunity to interpret the American Convention's restriction on
hate speech. The American Convention's provision is narrower than
the provision in the ICCPR, which resembles the original draft
provision of the American Convention. The ICCPR prohibits
propaganda for war and "any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence. ' 224 The ICCPR and the European Convention do not,
however, include a bar on censorship similar to that of the American
Convention. Therefore, the case law of these systems has only limited
precedential value. The provision on hate speech in the American
Convention bears greater similarity to U.S. case law. Consequently, a
review of U.S. case law may be more useful in interpreting this
provision than a perusal of the case law of other international
systems.

VI.

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM

Freedom of expression "includes and cannot be separated from
the right to use whatever medium is deemed appropriate to impart
ideas and to have them reach as wide an audience as possible.2 2 5

222.
Brandenburg vs. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
223.
Id. at 447.
224.
ICCPR, supra note 37, at art. 20. The UNHRC, in its General Comments,
has stated that this provision will not be fully effective unless States promulgate laws
that prohibit propaganda for war and hate speech and provide for appropriate
sanctions should the law be violated. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Cmt.
11, art. 20, 19th Sess. (1983), Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 12 (1994), available at http://wwwl.umn.eduthumanrtsl
gencommhrcom I1.htm.
225.
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74,
147
(Feb. 6, 2001); Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 5, 32
(Nov. 13, 1985); Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107,
109 (Jul. 2, 2004).
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Considering the media's essential role in a democratic society, it is
vital that it be permitted to gather and disseminate diverse
information and opinions. 226 Democracy is essential to the defense of
human rights, and freedom of the press is essential to the
maintenance of a democracy. States have used various means to
inhibit the press from publishing commentaries or facts that the
State views as negative or hostile. The Inter-American human rights
system has responded to many of these threats to the freedom of the
press.
A. Harassment,Imprisonment, and Murder of Journalists
In certain States, anyone who disseminates information that is
negative of the government or derogatory of public officials may be at
risk of repercussions. 227 Some repressive regimes harass, imprison, or
murder journalists who critically report on public affairs or
governmental activities. In doing so, the government is not only
intimidating or eliminating the targeted journalists but also
attempting to intimidate anyone who might consider investigating
and reporting on governmental corruption, human rights abuses, or
other wrongdoing. 228 The Inter-American Declaration of Principles on

226.
Ivcher Bronstein, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, 149; Herrera Ulloa, 2004 InterAm. Ct. H.R.,
117. The Inter-American Court has stated that "[tihe effective exercise
of representative democracy" underlies the enjoyment of human rights. Advisory
Opinion OC 6/86, 1986 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 6,
32 (May 9, 1986). "The
media provide information which influences not only opinions and attitudes but also
political choices, and this is why media freedom, pluralism and independence are
essential preconditions of democracy." KARACA, supra note 1, at 11.
227.
See In Imprisoning Journalists, Four Nations Stand Out, CPJ SPECIAL
REPORTS FROM AROUND THE WORLD, Feb. 3, 2005, http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2005/
imprisoned_04/imprison releaseO3febO5na.html [hereinafter Imprisoning Journalists].
The four nations labeled as those most repressive of a free press for the imprisonment
of journalists are China, Cuba, Eritrea, and Burma. Id.
228/
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON TERRORISM
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V[II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr.
297
(2002),
http://www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm.
The
Inter-American
Commission has stated in this regard that
[tihe murder, abduction, intimidation and threatening of journalists, as well as
the destruction of press materials, are most often carried out with two concrete
aims. The first is to eliminate journalists who are investigating attacks, abuses,
irregularities, or illegal acts of any kind committed by public officials,
organizations, or non-state actors. This is done to ensure that the
investigations are not completed or never receive the public debate they
deserve, or simply as a form of reprisal for the investigation itself. Secondly,
such acts are used as an instrument of intimidation to send an unmistakable
message to all members of civil society engaged in investigating attacks,
abuses, irregularities, or illicit acts of any kind. These practices seek to silence
the press in its watchdog role, or render it an accomplice to individuals or
institutions engaged in abusive or illegal actions. Ultimately, the goal of those
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Freedom of Expression states that "[t]he murder, kidnapping,
intimidation of and/or threats to social communicators, as well as the
material destruction of communications media violate the
fundamental rights of individuals and strongly restrict freedom of
229
expression."
Harassment may take the form of interference with a journalist's
ability to practice the profession. Domestic journalists may have their
licenses revoked, foreign journalists may be denied work permits or
entry or exit visas, and journalists who cover wars and other conflicts
may be detained or have their movements restricted. 230 Harassment
may also involve death threats, the infliction of physical injury to
either the journalist or to his or her family, 231 or the imprisonment of
the journalists. 2 32 Generally, journalists are imprisoned for allegedly
violating so-called "antistate" laws which may include "acting against
the interest of the state. ' 233 Professional journalists and other young
people who are disseminating dissident news and opinions on the
234
internet are also subject to arrest and harassment.
For some, exercising their freedom of expression can be deadly.
Journalists may be murdered for reporting on corruption, human
rights abuses, or governmental incompetence. Eleven journalists were
assassinated in the Western Hemisphere in 2004 due to their
professional activities as social commentators. 235 Although no

who engage in these practices is to keep society from being informed about such
occurrences, at any cost.
Id.
229.

Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle

9.
230.
Journalists who cover wars are also at risk. See KARACA, supra note 1, at 7.
The Council of Europe has "urged the international community to take steps to protect
journalists covering crises and conflicts." Id.
231.
In 2003, the Inter-American Commission noted an "alarming increase in
intimidations against the media" in Guatemala. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTERAMERICAN

COMMISSION

ON

HUMAN

RIGHTS

2003,

Inter-Am.

C.H.R.,

OEA/Ser.IJV/II/118, doc. 5 rev. 2 41 (2003), http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2003eng/
chap.4b.htm.
232.
One hundred twenty-two journalists were reportedly in prison worldwide at
the end of 2003. See ImprisoningJournalists,supra note 227.
233.
Committee to Protect Journalists, supra note 55.
234.
See id. In Iran, where people have turned to the internet for news because
certain newspapers have been banned and broadcasting is controlled by conservatives,
the government is cracking down. See id. A spokesperson for the Iranian judiciary
stated that "individuals operating unauthorized Web sites would be prosecuted for
'acting against national security, disturbing the public mind, and insulting sanctities."'
Id.
235.

ANNUAL REPORT OF SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, supra note 23, ch. II,

7; see

Serena Parker, Threats to Press Freedom Remain in Latin America, Say Analysts, THE
EPOCH TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004 (discussing the dangers faced by journalists in Latin
America)
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journalists were killed in Colombia in that period of time, it was
reportedly due to self-censorship of the media. Voice of America
reported that "[t]he fact that no journalists were killed in Columbia
this year, for the first time in at least a decade, is very good news, but
the reasons for it are troubling.' '23 6 The Inter-American Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression has described the assassinations of
journalists as "the most brutal means of restricting freedom of
expression."

237

The intimidation can go beyond individual reporters to the
owners of the media or the newspapers or television stations. After a
Guatemalan newspaper published articles critical of the government,
armed men entered the newspaper facilities and opened fire, forcing
the president of the paper to leave Guatemala. 23 8 When a Peruvian
television station broadcast expos6s of the government, the owner's
Peruvian citizenship was annulled. 23 9 This had the effect under
domestic law of removing him from ownership of the television
240
station, a right which was reserved solely for Peruvian citizens.
The Inter-American Court found that within the context of the case,
the government's actions were an indirect means of restricting the
owner's freedom of expression and, thus, a violation of his human
rights. 241 Moreover, the Court held that
[b]y separating Mr. Ivcher from the control of Channel 2 and excluding
the Contrapunto journalists, the State not only restricted their right to
circulate news, ideas and opinions, but also affected the right of all
Peruvians to receive information, thus limiting their freedom to
242
exercise political options and develop fully in a democratic society.

236.
Parker, supra note 235. The publisher of El Comercio, a Brazilian
newspaper stated that the "Committee Against Impunity has investigated 19 cases of
murdered journalists in Brazil." Press Release, Inter-American Press Assoc. [IAPA],
IAPA Welcomes Law that Places Human Rights Crimes Under Federal Jurisdiction
(Dec. 10, 2004), http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/63224/.
237.
Press Release, OAS, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression of the IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression
Deplores Assassination of Columbian Journalist, No. 115/05 (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://www.cidh.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?artlD=353&lID=l.
238.
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2003,
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2, Ch. III 7 42 (2003). In addition,
several of the newspaper's investigative journalists and staff received death threats. Id.
In response to a complaint of human rights abuse filed with the Commission, the
Commission ordered the government of Guatemala to take interim measures to protect
the director and the technical and administrative staff of the newspaper. Id.
239.
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74, 7 76(a),
(d), (g), (i), (j), (q).(Feb. 6, 2001).
240.
Id. 77 76 (e), (u), 160.
241.
Id. 77 162, 191(5).
242.
Id. 7 163.
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In the Carpio Nicolle case against Guatemala, the Inter-American
Court held that the right to freedom of expression of a well-known
rights
politician and newspaper owner who had reported on human
243
violations was violated when he was murdered in an ambush.
The essential role of journalists in a democracy may justify their
special protection. It is often journalists who expose human rights
abuses and spotlight governments engaged in gross human rights
violations. It has been argued that '"journalists' solemn duties to the
cause of human rights call for reciprocity from the human rights
cause in the form of special protection and assistance."2 44 The InterAmerican Court has stated in this regard that
journalists who work in the media should enjoy the necessary
protection and independence to exercise their functions to the fullest,
because it is they who keep society informed, [which is] an
indispensable requirement to enable society to enjoy full freedom and
245
for public discourse to become stronger.

The Inter-American Court and Inter-American Commission have
successfully ordered governments to protect the lives and physical
integrity of journalists who are in grave danger of irreparable harm.
The Convention authorizes the Inter-American Court to adopt
provisional measures "in cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and
when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons."2 46 The
Commission also issues requests to States to take precautionary
measures to protect journalists or the media in "serious and urgent
cases" and "whenever necessary according to the information
available. '"247 Interim measures are termed "precautionary measures"

243.
Carpio Nicolle v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 117,
76(15), (21), 155(1)(e) (Nov. 22, 2004). It was not clear whether Mr. Carpio Nicolle, a
member of the governmental opposition, was killed for his political convictions or for
printing them in his newspaper. See id.
244.
Amit Mukherjee, InternationalProtection of Journalists:Problem, Practice,
and Prospects, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 339, 344 (1994).
245.
Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 107,
150
(Jul. 2, 2004).
246.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 63(2). The American Convention
authorizes the Commission in "cases of extreme gravity and urgency" to circumvent its
time-consuming procedures and immediately request that the Inter-American Court
adopt provisional measures. Id.
247.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
art. 25(1)(d), approved by the Commission at its 109th special session held from
December 4-8, 2000, amended at its 116th regular period of sessions, held from
October 7-25, 2002 and at its 118th regular period of sessions, held from October 7-24,
2003. Neither the American Convention nor the Statute of the Commission authorizes
the Commission to request that a State adopt precautionary measures. The Court has
held that there is a presumption that Court-ordered provisional measures are
necessary when the Commission has previously ordered precautionary measures on its
own authority that were not effective and another threatening event has subsequently
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when adopted by the Commission and "provisional measures" when
ordered by the Inter-American Court.2 48 An order of interim
measures, for example, may require that a government provide
protection to journalists who have been threatened or may order the
release of a journalist from prison. Although a State Party to the
American Convention has an obligation, erga omnes, to protect all
persons subject to its jurisdiction, 249 the Court may use its authority
to call upon the State to take special measures to protect persons who
are in immediate danger. The overriding importance of provisional
measures in human rights cases arises from their potential to
terminate abuse rather than primarily to compensate the victim or
the victim's family after-the-fact. International proceedings, which
typically are not resolved for years, are inadequate in urgent
circumstances to protect persons from imminent danger or death.
The Inter-American Court issued provisional measures to protect
the lives and safety of journalists who worked for the Venezuelan
television station Radio Caracas Televisi6n after one journalist was
murdered and others had been shot, beaten, or threatened. 2 50 The
Commission and the Court also issued interim measures when the
office of a Venezuelan newspaper was invaded and the staff was
threatened. 251 The Court stated that those who provide social
commentary must have the opportunity to do their work in conditions
252
that are adequate to facilitate their freedom of expression.
If a case concerns freedom of expression, the Commission will
request precautionary measures on its own initiative or upon the
253
request of the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.
The Special Rapporteur has access to the most current information on
abuses and threats to the media in the Americas through an informal
network of journalists and news organizations, and he can, therefore,
urge the Commission to act immediately, before there is irreparable
damage. 254 For instance, the Commission ordered the Guatemalan
government to take measures to protect Guatemalan journalist Maria

occurred. Digna Ochoa y Plcido Case, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. E), No. 2,
6
(Nov. 17, 1999).
248.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
supra note 247, arts. 25, 74.
249.
Peace Community of San Jose de Apartad6 Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. of
H.R., (ser. E), 7 (June 18, 2002).
250.
Rios v. Venezuela, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. E),
1, 2 (Nov. 27, 2002).
251.
El Nacional and Asi Es La Noticia Newspapers Case, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. E) (July 6, 2004).
252.
Id. 10.
253.
Rules of Procedure of the Inter-Am. Comm. HR, supra note 247, art. 25(1).
254.
See Organization of American States [OAS], Functions & Objectives of the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, http://www.cidh.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?
artID=36&1ID=1.
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de los Angeles Monz6n Paredes and her family, who were threatened
because of her reporting on crucial human rights issues. 255 The
Commission likewise granted precautionary measures and ordered
the government of Haiti to protect a journalist and a radio
correspondent who had been subjected to death threats. 256 Freedom
of the press is essential to the protection of human rights, and
interim measures are invaluable to protect the lives of journalists
who put themselves at risk to publish accounts of human rights
abuse.
When States have not been successful in protecting journalists,
they must investigate human rights violations against journalists and
prosecute the perpetrators of the violations. The Inter-American
Principles on Freedom of Expression address this issue, stating, "[i]t
is the duty of the state to prevent and investigate such occurrences, to
punish their perpetrators and to ensure that victims receive due
compensation." 257 The Inter-American Court has repeatedly ordered
States to thoroughly investigate violations and to identify, prosecute
and punish the violators. 258 Moreover, a State's obligation to
investigate human rights violations must be undertaken "in a serious
'259
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective.
The State must punish the "intellectual authors" or "masterminds" of
the violation as well as the individuals who carried it out, whether or
not the perpetrators of the threats or violence are state agents.
Punishment will operate as a force against impunity by acting as both
a specific and a general deterrent. The Court has ordered that States
must use all legal means to combat impunity, which if unchecked
"fosters chronic recidivism of human rights violations and total
defenselessness of victims and their relatives. ' 260 Impunity for those
who violate the rights of journalists and the media encourages others
who may commit similar abuses. Recognizing this problem, the
Declaration of Chapultepec states that violent acts against journalists

255.
Maria de los Angeles Monz6n Paredes v. Guatemala, Inter-Am. Comm.
H.R. (Mar. 18, 2003).
256.
Liliane Pierre-Paul v. Haiti, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. (May 29, 2003).
257.
Declarationof Principles on Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle
9.
258.
See Cantoral Benavides Case, 2000 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 69, 12
8
(Aug. 18, 2000); Villagran Morales Case, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63,
(Nov. 19, 1999); Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 4,
33 (July 21, 1989).
226
Villagran Morales Case, 1999 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63,
259.
(Nov. 19, 1999).
173
260.
Paniagua Morales Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 37,
(Mar. 8, 1998). The Inter-American Court defines "impunity" as "the total lack of
investigation, prosecution, capture, trial and conviction of those responsible for
violations of the Inter-American Convention." Constitutional Court Case, 2001 InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 27, 123 (Jan. 31, 2001).
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and the media "must be investigated promptly and punished
26
harshly." 1
In serious cases, the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression may personally contact State authorities to express
concern or make recommendations on steps to be taken to protect
freedom of expression. If necessary, the Rapporteur will issue a press
release setting forth the violation, such as press releases in 2005 that
condemned death threats against three journalists in Colombia who
had received funeral wreaths. 26 2 Adverse international publicity has
often proven to be an effective tool in curtailing human rights
violations, 26 3 and even the threat of negative publicity may compel
the government to take corrective action. The Special Rapporteur is
not adverse to using the press to protect journalists and freedom of
expression.
B. Mandatory State Licensing of Journalists
Governments may attempt to limit journalistic freedom by
imposing restraints on the practice of journalism. The Inter-American
Declaration of the Principles on Freedom of Expression provides that
"[c]ompulsory membership or the requirements of a university degree
for the practice of journalism constitute unlawful restrictions of
freedom of expression. Journalistic activities must be guided by
'26 4
ethical conduct, which should in no case be imposed by the State.
The Inter-American Court has declared that the compulsory licensing
of journalists violates the American Convention's right to freedom of
expression. 26 5 In its advisory opinion Compulsory Membership in an
Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, the
Court was asked whether a Costa Rican law that required that
journalists be members of an association limited to graduates of the

261.
Declaration of Chapultepec, Hemisphere Conference on Free Speech, Mar.
11, 1994, Principle 4.
262.
Functions & Objectives of the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression, supra note 254; see Press Release, OAS, Office of the Special Rapporteur
for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom
of Expression Expresses Serious Concern about Threats to Three Columbian
Journalists, No. 123/05 (May 18, 2005), http://www.cidh.org/relatoria/showarticle.asp?
art1D=576&11D=1.
263.
Tom J. Farer, The OAS at the Crossroads:Human Rights, 72 IOWA L. REV.
401, 403 (1987).
264.
Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle
6. Also, the Declaration of Chapultepec specifies that "[t]he membership of journalists
in guilds, their affiliation to professional and trade associations and the affiliation of
the media with business groups must be strictly voluntary." Declaration of
Chapultepec, supra note 261, Principle 8.
265.
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5,
76
(Nov. 13, 1985).
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University of Costa Rica's journalism school violated freedom of
expression as protected by the American Convention. 26 6 Under the
law, it was an offense to be a reporter or otherwise practice
journalism in Costa Rica if one was not a member of the Costa Rican
Journalism Association. 26 7 The Inter-American Court advised Costa
Rica that the law was incompatible with the American Convention,
because it denied "any person access to the full use of the news media
as a means of expressing opinions or imparting information. '268 As a
result of the Inter-American Court's advisory opinion, the Costa
Rican Supreme Court's Constitutional Chamber nullified the
domestic law. 26 9 Subsequently, Chile's Supreme Court also struck
down a national requirement that journalists be members of a similar
270
type of organization.
Other States, however, continue to license journalists. The
Brazilian executive branch recently proposed to create a "federal
271
journalism council to guide and oversee the journalism profession."
The council would "orient, discipline and monitor" journalists, who
would have to register with the government agency to practice
journalism. 272 The council could impose penalties and could even
banish reporters from the profession. 273 Brazil's President revealed
that the goal of the organization was to regulate the content of the
media, stating that the council would encourage media to adopt a
"positive agenda" when covering governmental affairs.2 74 A similar
law in Bolivia has been condemned by the Inter-American
275
Commission.

266.
The Court did not hold that the organization of the practice of professions,
such as law, into associations, or colegios, was per se a violation of the Convention. Id.
68.
For a discussion of the facts underlying this request, see Thomas
267.
Buergenthal, Remembering the Early Years of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 259, 264-69 (2005).
Advisory Opinion OC-5185, 85.
268.
See Pedro Nikken, La Funcion Consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de
269.
Derechos Humanos, in EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS
HuMANOS EN EL UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI: MEMORIA DEL SEMINARiO NOVIEMBRE DE

1999, at 161, 178 (2001).
Editorial, Foran Independent Press, MIAMI HERALD, Sep. 9, 2004, at 24A.
270.
271.
Id.
272.
Id.
Id.
273.
Id.
274.
Press Release, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, The IACHR
275.
Expresses its Concern over the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela's Passage of the
Social Responsibility in Radio and Television Bill, No. 25/04 (Nov. 30, 2004) (expressing
concern about Venezuela's passage of the Social Responsibility in Radio and Television
Bill), http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2004/25.04.htm.
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C. Contempt Laws for Refusal to Reveal Sources
The Inter-American Court has not yet addressed the issue of
whether the use of contempt laws to imprison journalists who refuse
to reveal anonymous sources is compatible with the American
Convention. Whistle blowers and informants are more likely to come
forward when they are assured that their identities will not be
revealed. If a person's name may be disclosed despite the person's
wish to remain anonymous, it may have a chilling effect on an
individual's willingness to reveal irregularities. The Inter-American
Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression specifies that
"[e]very social communicator has the right to keep his/her source of
information,
notes,
personal
and
professional
archives
'276
confidential.
The European human rights system supports journalists' right to
refuse to reveal sources except in limited circumstances. The
European Court of Human Rights has ruled that a journalist has the
right to protect confidential sources except in narrowly-defined
circumstances. 277 Under Article 10 of the European Convention, a
journalist must reveal a confidential source "where vital public or
individual interests [are] at stake." 278 In Goodwin v. United Kingdom,
a journalist refused to reveal the confidential source of damaging
business information.2 79 The company alleged that the information
was stolen and that its publication could damage the company. 280 The
domestic tribunals in the UK sided with the company, barring the
publication of the information and ordering the journalist to reveal
his source. 28 1 When the journalist refused he was held in contempt of
court and fined. 28 2 The journalist then filed a complaint with the
European human rights system, arguing that his right to freedom of
expression under the European Convention on Human Rights had
been violated. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that the
order to reveal the journalistic source and the fine imposed on the
journalist for refusing to do so were incompatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights. 28 3 The Court reasoned that the
"[pirotection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for

276.
Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle
8; see also Declaration of Chapultepec, supra note 261, Preamble ("Judges with limited
vision order journalists to reveal sources that should remain in confidence.").
277.
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 (1996).
278.
Id. at 141.
279.
Id. at 126-28.
280.
Id.; see RICHARD S. GORDON ET AL., THE STRASBOURG CASE LAW: LEADING
CASES FROM THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS 1186-87 (2001).
281.
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 146 (1996).
282.
Id. at 125.
283.
Id. at 146.

426

VANDERBIL T]OURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39..379

press freedom." 28 4 The Court further clarified that "[w]ithout such
protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in
informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the
vital public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the
ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may
be adversely affected. 2 85
Repressive countries look towards U.S. domestic law in support
of their treatment of journalists who fail to reveal journalistic sources
and who are then held in criminal contempt. 286 U.S. federal law
provides that a journalist who refuses to reveal his confidential
sources in certain circumstances can be punished for criminal
contempt. The U.S. Supreme Court does not permit a journalist to
maintain source confidentiality at all times. In Branzburg v. Hayes,
the Supreme Court held that no First Amendment privilege exists "to
refuse to answer the relevant and material questions asked during a
good-faith grand jury investigation."28 7 More recently the Court
rejected any notion of a "general-purpose reporter's privilege for
confidential sources, whether by virtue of the First Amendment or of
a newly hewn common law privilege." 28 8 Although thirty-one U.S.
states have passed shield laws to provide journalists with some
28 9
means of protecting their sources during grand jury investigations,
the U.S. federal government does not have a shield law. According to
the Committee to Protect Journalists, "[U.S. law] makes it easier for
governments around the world, repressive governments, to justify

284.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 143.
285.
Parker, supra note 235.
286.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972). Branzburg was a staff
287.
reporter for a daily Kentucky newspaper. Id. at 667. He reported on two stories which
subsequently resulted in a case before the Supreme Court. Id. First, Branzburg did a
story detailing his time spent with two youths selling marijuana. Id. at 667-71. Soon
after the piece ran, Branzburg was subpoenaed before a grand jury. Id. However,
Branzburg refused to reveal the names of the parties involved. Id. In the second case,
Branzburg published a story, developed from interviews with drug users. Id. The
article contained unnamed sources and once again Branzburg was subpoenaed to
reveal the names of his sources. Id. Branzburg claimed he had a privilege as a
journalist to refuse to reveal confidential sources. Id.
288.
In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 690-91). More recently reporters from Time Magazine and the New York
Times were charged with contempt when they refused to reveal their sources to a
grand jury. A special prosecutor for the Justice Department was investigating the leak
of the name of a CIA operative which occurred after the operative's husband had
criticized a claim by the Bush administration that Iraq had attempted to acquire
uranium from Niger. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141
(D.C. Cir. 2006) cert. denied sub. nom. Miller v. United States, 125 S.Ct. 2977 (2005).
Josh Kobrin, A Shield for Journalists, American Constitution Society for
289.
Law and Policy Blog, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www.acsblog.org/criminal-law-512-a-shieldlaw-for.journalists-.html.
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their own repressive policies, which in many cases result in the
incarceration of journalist [s].1"290
International law should require that States protect a
journalist's right to refuse to reveal confidential sources.
International treaties and the courts that interpret them should
encourage States to pass legislation that would help to insure
freedom of the press by shielding reporters from revealing their
confidential sources even when ordered to do so before a grand
jury. 291 In this way, the Inter-American system could contribute to
international jurisprudence which will strengthen support of freedom
of expression and freedom of the press in this area.

VII.

FAILURE TO PROMULGATE LAWS TO PROTECT FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION

Freedom of expression may be violated not only when a State
promulgates laws that violate a right but also when the State fails to
promulgate laws or to enforce laws that protect rights. More
specifically, many States have failed to pass laws that outlaw
monopoly ownership of the media. Others have antitrust laws that
bar monopolization of the media, but States may not enforce the laws.
Likewise, some States have failed to enact access to information laws
or to enforce those laws. The OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Information has a mandate from the OAS General Assembly to assist
the American States to draft initiatives to protect freedom of speech,
292
particularly in the area of freedom of information laws.

290.
291.

Id.
In introducing his free speech bill in the U.S. Senate, Senator Dodd stated,

[tihis legislation is fundamentally about good government and the free and
unfettered flow of information to the public .... The American people deserve
access to a wide array of views so that they can make informed decisions and
effectively participate in matters of public concern. When the public's right to
know is threatened, and when the rights of free speech and free press are at
risk, all of the other liberties we hold dear are endangered. The legislation that
I am introducing today will protect these rights, and ensure that the
government remains open and accountable to its citizens.
Press Release, Christopher Dodd, Dodd Introduces the Free Speech Protection Act of
2004 (Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.senate.gov/-dodd/press/Releases/04/1119.htm.
292.
General Assembly of the Organization of American States, AG/Res. 2121
(XXXV-0/05) Access to Public Information: Strengthening Democracy, (May 26, 2005).
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A. Access to Information Laws
Access to information laws, also called "freedom of information"
laws, allow individuals or organizations to obtain information
contained in public records. The accessibility of information arguably
increases public awareness of salient social issues, thereby improving
freedom of speech. Freer accessibility of public records also increases
the transparency of government operations, making corruption less
likely or at least more discernible. A major impetus for the recent
legislation of public access laws is the belief that governments are
more credible when the public is aware of the government's
actions. 293 When measures are taken to provide for a more
transparent government, corruption may be reduced.2 94 The culture
of secrecy that exists in the public sector of many countries cannot
withstand the exposure that comes from freedom of information laws.
Democracy relies upon citizens' rights to seek public information.
International experts on freedom of expression have emphasized the
importance of this right. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the
Media, and the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression
made a joint declaration stating that access to information is a
fundamental human right. 29 5 In their declaration, they recognized
"the fundamental importance of access to information to democratic
participation, to holding governments accountable and to controlling
corruption." 296 The Inter-American Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression provides that
[a]ccess to information held by the state is a fundamental right of every
individual. States have the obligation to guarantee the full exercise of
this right. This principle allows only exceptional limitations that must
be previously established by law in case of a real and imminent danger
297
that threatens national security in democratic societies.

293.
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Christopher J. Lhulier, Information Access
Rights Based on InternationalHuman Rights Law, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 899 (1997). The
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund also have been pressuring countries
to adopt a more open style of government. See id. These organizations are interested in
legitimatizing financial systems in these countries by eliminating secrecy and
corruption. See id.
294.
DAVID BANISAR, THE FREEDOMINFO.ORG GLOBAL SURVEY: FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION AND ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT RECORD LAWS AROUND THE WORLD 3
(2004).

295.
Joint Declaration of the Special Rapporteurs, supra note 166.
296.
Id.
297.
Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle
4. The Declaration also provides that "[e]very person has the right to access to
information about himself or herself or his/her assets expeditiously and not onerously,
whether it be contained in databases or public or private registries, and if necessary to
update it, correct it and/or amend it." Id. Principle 3.
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In light of this right, more than fifty countries worldwide have
298
adopted laws increasing the accessibility of government records.
Throughout Central and South America, Belize, Columbia, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru have
enacted access to information laws. 299 Many other States, including
Argentina, are considering similar legislation. 300 The harmonization
of national access to information laws has come about as a result of
States modeling newly-enacted access to information laws after the
30 1
existing laws of other countries.
Most access to information laws allow certain exemptions to the
State's duty to provide information. According to the Joint
Declaration by the Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression,
these exemptions should be carefully limited "to protect overriding
public and private interests, including privacy. '30 2 Typically these
exemptions protect the internal decision-making activities of the
government. Despite claims of security, the threshold question
"allows for information to be released even if harm is shown if the
public benefit in knowing the information outweighs the harm that
'30 3
may be caused from disclosure.
The Inter-American Commission recently held that Chile
violated a petitioner's right to freedom of expression under the
American Convention due to its failure to guarantee access to public
information. 30 4 A Chilean environmental group, the Terrain
Foundation, had requested general and environmental information
about the company managing the Condor River Project, a major
logging operation in Chile. The request was ignored by the
Government and subsequent appeals to Chilean courts were
dismissed. 305 The Inter-American Commission held that the right to
freedom of expression guaranteed by the American Convention
includes the right to access information held by governmental
authorities. 30 6 The Commission recommended that Chile bring its

298.
BANISAR, supra note 294, at 3. At least forty of these countries enacted
freedom of information legislation in the past decade. Freedom of Expression
Rapporteurs Call for more open Government, International Freedom of Expression
eXchange [IFEX], http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/ful63092/.
299.
BANISAR, supra note 294, at 1-2. Banisar provides each State's access to
information laws as of May 2004. See id.; see also Parker, supra note 235.
300.
Parker, supra note 235.
301.
BANISAR, supra note 294, at 4.
302.
Joint Declaration of Special Rapporteurs, supra note 166.
303.
BANISAR, supra note 294, at 5.
304.
Marcel Claude Reyes v. Chile Case 12.108, Report No. 60/03, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEAISer. UJV/11.118, doc 70 rev. 2, at 222 (2003).
305.
See id.; see also Written Comments of Open Society Justice Initiative et. al.
as Amici Curiae in the Marcel Claude Reyes v. Chile case.
306.
Marcel Claude Reyes v. Chile, Case 12.108, Report No. 60/03, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser. LIV/II. 118 Doc 70 rev. 2, at 222 (2003); see also Open Society Justice
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domestic laws into conformity with the American Convention so as to
30 7
guarantee that citizens have effective access to public information.
When Chile did not implement the Commission's recommendations,
the Commission referred the case to the Inter-American Court, where
it is pending.
B. Monopolization of Ownership of the Media
The concentration of media ownership into the hands of a few
individuals or companies threatens the fabric of democracy. Editorial
independence, unbiased news reporting or, at least, multiple news
sources providing differing views are essential to a democracy. A
publication of the Council of Europe warns against concentration of
the media stating, "grouping several branches of the mass media
under single ownership leads to monopolization. ' 308 Only with
pluralism of the media will freedom of expression and, ultimately,
democracy be protected. Governments must protect against national
broadcasting monopolies and media concentration. Domestic media
policy and law must serve to protect a pluralistic media.
The Inter-American Court has interpreted the right to freedom of
expression as barring monopolization of the media. 30 9 Although
addressing one form of monopolization of the media, that of licensing
journalists, the Court held that the Convention's right to freedom of
expression prohibits other forms of media monopoly. In this regard,
the Court stated "there must be, inter alia, a plurality of means of
communication, the barring of all monopolies thereof, in whatever
form. 3 10 In its advisory opinion on the licensing of journalists, the
Court stated that "[it is equally true that the right to impart
information and ideas cannot be invoked to justify the establishment
of private or public monopolies of the communications media designed
to mold public opinion by giving expression to only one point of
31
view." 1
The Inter-American Declaration of Principles of Freedom of
Expression provides that

Initiative, First Freedom of Information Case Reaches America's Court, Inter-American
Commission Finds Chile in Violation of Human Rights Charter,July 14, 2005.
307.
Marcel Claude Reyes v. Chile, Case 12.108, Report No. 60/03, Inter-Am.
C.H.R., OEA/Ser. LI'V/II. 118 Doc 70 rev. 2, at 222 (2003).
308.
KARACA, supra note 1, at 7.
309.
Advisory Opinion OC.5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 5,
33
(Nov. 13, 1985). The Inter-American Court's comments against monopolization of the
media were made in the context of an advisory opinion which has no binding force. See
id.
310.
Id. 1 34.
311.
Id. 33.
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[m]onopolies or oligopolies in the ownership and control of the
communication media must be subject to anti-trust laws, as they
conspire against democracy by limiting the plurality and diversity
which ensure the full exercise of people's right to information. In no
case should such laws apply exclusively to the media. The concession of
radio and television broadcast frequencies should take into account
democratic criteria that provide equal opportunity of access for all
312
individuals.

States should pass antitrust legislation and enforce these laws when
monopolization of the media is threatened.

VIII. ACCESS TO THE MEDIA
It is difficult, especially for poorer States to insure that all people
within their jurisdictions have fair access to the media. In rural,
poverty-stricken areas of many Latin American countries most people
have radios. Newspapers are also relatively cheap and available. The
internet, however, is not accessible to many people. The InterAmerican Court stated that "freedom of expression requires, in
principle, that the communication media are potentially open to all
without discrimination or, more precisely, that there be no
'3 13
individuals or groups that are excluded from access to such media.
A concern of the Council of Europe also has been "to ensure fair
access for everyone to new information sources. '314 It has stated in
this regard that
[aill people should be afforded equal opportunities to receive, seek and
impart information by any means of communication without any
discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinions, national or social origin, economic status,
315
birth or any other social condition.

States should be under a progressive obligation to ensure access to
the media to everyone, including marginalized groups such as women,
refugees and minorities who do not speak the predominant
3 16
language.

312.

Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle

313.
314.
315.

Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, 1985 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R (ser. A) No. 5, 34.
KARACA, supra note 1, at 10.
Declarationof Principleson Freedom of Expression, supra note 35, Principle

12.

2.
316.
See The Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression in Africa,
African Commission on Human and People's Rights, Oct. 2002, Principle III.

432

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

IX.

[VOL. 39-379

CORRESPONDING DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The American Convention does not have a specific provision that
specifies that a party exercising rights to freedom of expression also
incurs corresponding duties and obligations. The ICCPR stipulates
that the exercise of freedom of expression "carries with it special
duties and responsibilities. ''3 7 Likewise, the European Convention
provides that the exercise of freedom of expression "carries with it
duties and responsibilities. '318 The American Convention does have a
general provision balancing the rights enshrined in the American
3 19
Convention with the duties of the recipients of those rights.
Media commentators should practice professionalism and
responsible journalism in exercising their right to freedom of
expression. The media must self-regulate to avoid the more onerous
regulations that States may impose in attempting to control the
media. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda observed
that "[tihe power of the media to create and destroy fundamental
human values comes with great responsibility. Those who control
'320
such media are accountable for the consequences.

X. CONCLUSION

The Inter-American human rights system has made valuable
contributions to the evolution of the doctrine of freedom of expression
in international law, but it can do more. The American Convention
provides for broad protection of freedom of expression, allowing few
restrictions. Permissible restrictions are specifically enumerated, and
prior censorship is permitted only to regulate access to public
entertainment for the protection of the morals of children and
adolescents and when there is a state of emergency. Indirect methods
of interference with freedom of expression, such as abuse of private or
governmental controls on broadcasting frequencies or newsprint, are
specifically barred.
The Commission and the Inter-American Court have interpreted
the Convention's provision on freedom of expression to strengthen
protections in the Americas. The OAS Rapporteur on Freedom of

317.
ICCPR, supra note 37, art. 19.3.
318.
European Convention, supranote 37, art. 10.2.
319.
American Convention, supra note 13, art. 32 ("Every person has
responsibilities to his family, his community and mankind," and "[t]he rights of each
person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just
demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.").
320.
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeza Case ICTR-99-52,
Judgment and Sentence 945 (Dec. 3, 2003).
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Expression assists the Commission in evaluating complaints alleging
the abuse of freedom of expression and works with States to improve
their compliance with the American Convention. The Court and the
Commission attempt to provide immediate protection to journalists
who are in imminent danger of bodily harm or death by ordering
States to take interim measures to protect journalists and other social
commentators. The Court has also ruled that government-imposed
licensing laws which require that journalists belong to an
have particular
organization that requires that journalists
3 21
credentials violates the American Convention.
In 2005, the Court had three opportunities to make great strides
in the area of criminal defamation. The Court provided protection of
freedom of expression by clarifying that journalists are not required
to prove the truth of statements quoted from third parties.3 22 The
Court also determined that criminal suits for defamation and
criminal sanctions are undue restrictions on freedom of expression
when the allegedly defamatory statements are made about persons
whose activities are within the domain of public interest.3 2 3 The
Court did not further advance international jurisprudence on freedom
of expression by stating unequivocally that defamation should be a
civil offense in all cases and that criminal defamation laws per se are
not a proportionate restriction on freedom of expression under the
American Convention. As a lesser measure, the Court could have
specified that in defamation cases, in general, truth is always a
defense and that the burden of establishing the libelous nature of any
statement is on the person claiming to have been defamed. Moreover,
the Court could have established a test to be applied in national
courts to balance the right to reputation of persons engaged in public
activities with freedom of expression.
The contributions to the international protection of freedom of
expression by the Commission, the Inter-American Court, and the
OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression have been
impressive. In future cases, the Court will hopefully take additional
steps to further protect this basic right.
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